|摘要: ||本研究利用台灣省政府77-84會計年度分配給21縣市的補助款資料觀察在各種不同種類的選舉年當中，國民黨是否利用台灣省政府的行政資源，藉補助縣市以增加該黨在各種選舉中勝選的機會。具體來說，本研究檢驗幾個假設，第一，台灣省政府在選舉年所編列的補助預算額度比非選舉年為高。第二，不管選舉的種類為何，在上次選舉競爭越激烈（指國民黨對非國民黨）的縣市，傾向於在新的選舉年得到省政府越多的補助。第三，基於台灣省政府與台灣省議會的交易關係最為直接，故而在選舉年當中，國民黨籍省議員在選戰之前的補助需求會比其他種類選舉（縣市長或是立法委員）更顯著地反映在台灣省政府的補助預算內。 分析結果顯示，第一，選舉年當中，台灣省政府的補助預算規模的確大過於非選舉年。第二，省政府不分選舉年或是非選舉年均對於前一次省議員選舉當中國民黨籍與非國民黨籍競爭激烈的縣市特別給予較多的補助款。第三，省政府將超額的補助款送到那些既是國民黨執政又是前一次縣市長選舉戰況激烈的縣市。第四，省政府補助款的分配與立法委員選戰當中不同黨籍參選人競爭激烈程度無顯著的關聯。第五，就各種選舉對於補助款分配之相對影響力看來，影響省政府補助款分配多寡的選舉因素最為明顯的為「前一次省議員選舉國民黨與非國民黨參選人戰況激烈的縣市」與「國民黨籍執政的縣市」。變數「縣市長當選者與落選第一名在前一次選舉得票率的差距越小」的影響力較小，統計上顯著的影響力僅出現在選舉年期間。變數「國民黨與非國民黨籍立法委員在前一次競選中的得票率差距」對於省政府補助款分配沒有顯著的影響。第六，上述與選舉有關的政治因素固然影響台灣省政府補助款的分配，但是我們同時發現縣市客觀的需求變數「自有財源比例」與補助款分配之間有著相當程度的|
The present study explores whether the geographic distribution of grants among counties and cities, offered by the Taiwan Provin-cial Government (TPG) from FY1988 to FY1995, is aiming at e-qualizing local finance or manipulating elections. Specifically, we ask if the size of grants during the election years is larger than non-election years? We also ask whether the decision regarding the dis-tribution of grants made by the Taiwan Provincial Government is contingent upon the consideration of electoral success of the ruling party KMT? That is, under the command of the ruling party KMT, does the TPG offer disproportionate grants to the most vulnerable districts regardless of the objective needs? Briefly, statistical results show that the size of provincial grants during the election years is larger than non-election years. The re-sults also show that the disproportionate provincial grants do flow to KMT's vulnerable districts in the election of the Taiwan Provincial Legislators and the election of county in chief and city mayor, but not in the election of Lawmakers of the Legislative Yuan. These findings suggest that, in addition to maintaining the KMT's partisan advantaged position, the TPG distributes disproportionate benefits to vulnerable districts based on political considerations of its own. First, the budget security of the TPG is dependent on the Taiwan Provincial Legislators. Thus, helping candidates of provincial leg-islators who are most vulnerable to be elected or reelected by dis-tributing provincial grants to his or her districts may exchange fu-ture support of provincial legislators. Second, the TPG needs the cooperation of city government and county government in policy implementation. Hence, the TPG expect to bring partnership of lo-cal governments in the future if the TPG offers assistant expendi-tures for those incumbents of city mayor or county in chief who are most vulnerable in the election. Finally, although we find clear evidences of political manipula-tion in the distribution of Taiwan provincial grants, the objective criteria-capacity of self-financing still plays an important role in the decision of grant distribution. We find that the counties or cities with low capacity of self-financing receive more grants than those with high capacity of self-financing. In other words, electoral consideration may exist in the distribution of provincial grants, yet equalizing local finance is still not ignored in the decision process.