淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/19559
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    题名: Branch banking, entry deterrence, and technology decisions
    作者: Lin, Jyh-horng
    贡献者: 淡江大學國際貿易學系
    关键词: branch banking;entry deterrence;backward technology;advanced technology
    日期: 1997
    上传时间: 2009-11-04 17:21:50 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Amsterdam: Elsevier BV * North-Holland
    摘要: The paper sets up a theoretical model of banking firms to investigate the relationship between oligopolistic competition and technology structure by using the concept of decentralized operating decisions and centralized investment decisions. It concludes that the representative branch and the new entrant will choose the technology which is deviated from its cost-minimization level if neither of them acts as a quasi-competitive deposit demanders in the case of costless reversibility of capacity decision. In the case of capacity reversed not costlessly, the representative branch will choose the cost-minimizing technology level and the entrant's technology decision depends on its rival's conjectural variation.
    關聯: International Review of Economics & Finance 6(4), pp.421-430
    DOI: 10.1016/S1059-0560(97)90032-0
    显示于类别:[國際企業學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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