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    题名: Subcontracting and international trade policy
    作者: 梁文榮;陳和全;徐茂炫
    贡献者: 淡江大學產業經濟學系
    日期: 2001-04-21
    上传时间: 2009-08-25 10:23:23 (UTC+8)
    出版者: 臺北市:臺北大學經濟系
    摘要: This paper examines the optimal trade policies when internationalsubcontracting occurs between two competing firms. It shows that ifthe comparative advantage effect dominates the cost saving transfereffect, the exporting country will impose a different policy on eachexport. In contrast, if the cost saving transfer effect dominates thecomparative advantage effect, the exporting country will impose a taxpolicy on both exports. However, there never exists an optimal policyto subsidize the export of both subcontracted product and finalproduct. Even though the exporting firm is assumed away its export offinal good, to subsidize the export of the subcontracted good is notnecessarily an optimal policy for the exporting country. For theimporting country, if the price elasticity of demand is sufficientlysmall and the marketing cost of final product is large enough, it isoptimal to set a negative tariff.
    國際代工;最適貿易政策;Nash談判;行銷成本;國際貿易政策;International Subcontracting;Optimal Trade Policy;Nash Bargaining;Marketing Cost;International Trade Policy
    關聯: 第五屆經濟發展學術研討會論文集,22頁
    显示于类别:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 會議論文

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