| Abstract: | For decades, Germany has strongly shaped the economy-focused European Union's (EU) China policy. It has prospered from the long-standing liberal internationalism paradigm in EU-China relations, contributing to more than one-third of the EU's trade with China and Taiwan. On the other hand, Germany has always been negligible politically in Taiwan Strait relations. Alarmed by China's growing power, assertiveness, and military threats, Berlin issued a long-awaited "Strategy on China" in 2023, describing China as a competitor, partner, and systemic rival. How can a middle power like Germany contribute to stabilising the international order in this era of increasing hegemonic conflict? With Taiwan being a critical case, this paper traces the German-Taiwan-China triangle interactions since 2019, when Germany and the EU began to successively outline a robust liberal internationalism (RLI) paradigm with several strategy papers positioned against authoritarianism and coercion while perceiving Taiwan as like-minded that supports democracy and a rules-based order. Using the framework of RLI, which this paper introduces, it analyses the relevant strategy papers, political events, and comments among the three under the new paradigm. Theoretically, Germany's and the EU's reformed China policies represent a signalling strategy, which, in game theory, is a set of measures that do not directly deter a third actor but attempt to demonstrate that changed action will lead to consequences a third actor wants to avoid. Embedded in the EU, this policy-innovative double-track signalling towards Taiwan and China has predictable implications in case of rule-breaking, thus shaping Germany's and the EU's application of RLI. |
