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    題名: Nash Equilibria of a Two-Party Policy Competition Game
    作者: Lin, Chuang-chieh;Lu, Chi-jen;Chen, Po-an
    關鍵詞: Pure-strategy;Nash equilibrium;Game theory
    日期: 2024-05-17
    上傳時間: 2024-06-07 12:05:24 (UTC+8)
    摘要: Abstract—We introduce the two-party policy competition as a two player non-cooperative game, which is an extended work of [Lin et al. 2021]. The player which can benefit the all voters more has higher chance of winning and the payoff is the expected utility that its supporters will have. By formulating the winning probability as an outcome of a linear function, we show that the two-party policy competition game has a pure-strategy equilibrium in the degenerate case of one-dimension and in the general case under the so-called consensus-reachable assumption.
    關聯: Proceedings of the 41st Workshop on Combinatorial Mathematics and Computation Theory (CMCT 2024)
    顯示於類別:[資訊工程學系暨研究所] 會議論文

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