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    Title: Is price undertaking a more friendly protection policy than an anti-dumping duty?
    Authors: Peng, Cheng-Hau;Hwang, Hong;Kao, Kuo-Feng
    Keywords: anti-dumping duty;price undertaking
    Date: 2023-01
    Issue Date: 2023-04-28 17:43:55 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Ltd
    Abstract: It is generally believed that price undertaking is a more
    amicable protection policy for a foreign dumping firm
    than an anti-dumping (AD) duty as the former allows
    the foreign dumping firm to keep the duty rents. However, this result contradicts the empirical finding in, who shows that only 41% of anti-dumping
    measures in EEC end up with price undertaking in 1981–2001, even though firms can commit to a minimum price instead of being imposed with an anti-dumping duty. From the perspective of the dumping firm, this paper shows that whether the price-undertaking police is more or less amicable than the AD duty is contingent upon the competition modes of the firms in the industry.
    Relation: World Economy 46(1), p.120-134
    DOI: 10.1111/twec.13309
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics] Journal Article

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