The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis: What did the August Exercises Around Taiwan Accomplish?

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题名:	The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis: What did the August Exercises Around Taiwan Accomplish?
作者:	Lin, Ying Yu
日期:	2022-10-04
上传时间:	2023-04-28 16:43:40 (UTC+8)
出版者:	The Jamestown Foundation
摘要:	As the Russia-Ukrainian War rages on, a “crisis” of a similar vein unexpectedly erupted in the Taiwan Strait this summer. Some observers attributed the escalation of tension to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Taipei, which subsequently ignited a war of words between leaders in Beijing and Washington (81.cn, August 4). As a matter of fact, the moment Pelosi arrived in Taipei, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) announced its decision to hold live-fire drills in six designated areas in the waters around Taiwan (Xinhuanet, August 2). How could the PLA organize such massive drills on such short notice? Put another way, with or without Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) might have already planned to hold large-scale military drills around Taiwan prior to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which is scheduled to begin on October 16 (China Brief, September 20). Beijing appears to have used the Pelosi visit as a pretext for the show of military force that followed. On China’s part, the best way to achieve the separate goals of intimidating Taiwan, making its bottom line fully known to the U.S., and expanding its internal power at once in the lead-up to the 20th National Congress of the CPC (hereafter referred to as the 20th Party Congress) is through military actions of various sorts. There is a compelling reason to do so. Nearly seven years into the across-the-board military reforms launched in late 2015 by President and Central Military Commission Chairman (CMC) Xi Jinping, the PLA needs to prove that it has become a more joint and combat-capable force. All these considerations might be the reasons behind Beijing’s recent launch of military drills around Taiwan in a move intended to demonstrate determination to solve the Taiwan issue once and for all ahead of the 20th Party Congress. Notably, Pelosi’s visit to Taipei is not unprecedented, as then House Speaker Newt Gingrich visited Taiwan in 1997 (Office of the President, Taiwan, March 2, 1997). However, judging from the exercise zones announced by the PRC in response to the Pelosi visit, Beijing has demonstrated an obvious intention to break the long-standing tacit agreement between China, Taiwan, and the U.S. regarding certain red lines not to be crossed by all three parties. China’s intention is to demonstrates to the other parties that the PLA is now capable of projecting force beyond Taiwan to the Pacific and the waters off Taiwan’s east coast. Such a capability can even serve the purpose of blockading Taiwan. As the PLA’s ability to target Taiwan improves, Xi may well have more bargain chips at his disposal in engaging the U.S. diplomatically during his would-be third term in office.
關聯:	China Brief 22(18), p.26-29
显示于类别:	[國際事務與戰略研究所] 期刊論文

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