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    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/120945


    题名: CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Earnings Management: Does Compensation Structure Matter?
    其它题名: CEO薪酬、董事薪酬與盈餘管理-薪酬結構重要嗎?
    作者: 湯惠雯;陳振遠
    关键词: Compensation structure;CEO compensation;director compensation;earnings management;incentive compensation
    日期: 2021-06-30
    上传时间: 2021-08-19 12:11:09 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Journal of Financial Studies
    摘要: This study investigates the relationship between excess director compensation and CEO compensation and explores the effects of various abnormal CEO compensations on earnings management. The results show that CEOs who receive abnormal cash and bonus compensation resulting from excess director total compensation tend to increase firm profits through earnings management, thereby reducing future performance. By contrast, CEOs who receive abnormal incentive compensation, total compensation, and exercise-value of stock options are less likely to manipulate earnings. These findings suggest that a proper director and CEO compensation structure can reduce managerial earnings management and can motivate CEO-director collaboration.
    關聯: Journal of Financial Studies,29 (2),p.1-36
    DOI: 10.6545/JFS.202106_29(2).0001
    显示于类别:[風險管理與保險學系] 期刊論文

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