We investigate the announcement returns and long run performance of SEOs conducted by public firms in four East Asia markets in the period from 2003 to 2015. The shareholder approval is required for equity issuance in our sample. The empirical results show that both the announcement and post-issue abnormal returns are significantly negative. Our findings contradict the evidences in Holderness (2018) that the announcement returns are significantly positive for SEOs when shareholders must vote to approve equity issuances. Our results of long-run underperformance also demonstrate that mandatory shareholder approval does not effectively mitigate the managerial agency problem associated with SEOs.
本文檢視東亞股票市場上市公司在現金增資宣告報酬以及長期績效，研究期間為2003年至2015年。在研究期間內，這些股市的現金增資都需要經過股東大會的核准。Holderness（2018）主張，若現金增資需要經股東核准，可以降低代理問題，因此其宣告報酬為正，然而本文的實證研究結果顯示，平均的宣告報酬與發行後的長期績效都是為負且統計顯著，與Holderness（2018）的主張並不一致。此外，關於負的長期績效，本文的實證發現，需要強制性的股東同意權的規定，並不能實質地改善現金增資所產生的管理者代理問題。
