This study investigates the influence of controlling ownership and the divergence between control rights and cashflow rights on a firm’s risk-taking, and the effect of industry competition on the relationship. The research results show that controlling ownership and firm risk-taking presents a U-shaped relationship. When controlling ownership is relatively low, a firm has high risk-taking. As controlling ownership increases, controlling shareholders tend to reduce firm risk-taking to protect their own interests. If controlling shareholdings exceeds a certain ratio, they have high control over a firm's investment decisions. In consideration of firm competitiveness and long-term profitability, they incline to increase firm risk-taking to enhance future firm value. In competitive industry, firms need to invest more research and development (R&D) expenditures (i.e. take more risk) to maintain product competitiveness. Controlling ownership and the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights reduce firm risk-taking in highly competitive industries. It is worth noting that firm risk-taking due to controlling ownership is significantly positively related to future firm value; risk-taking due to control-cash flow rights does not increase firm value.