淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/119079
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    题名: Vertical Separation and Collusion
    作者: 高國峯;陳金盛
    关键词: Vertical Separation;Trigger Strategy;Collusion
    日期: 2020-07-31
    上传时间: 2020-09-17 12:12:04 (UTC+8)
    摘要: This paper examines an integrated firm’s incentive to undertake vertical separation with forward-looking behavior. In an infinitely repeated game we show that tacit collusion among firms in a final good market is more likely to be sustained under vertical separation than under vertical integration. The integrated firm tends to vertically separate its business if the discount factor is
    at a medium level and the input price is sufficiently low. Finally, an increase in the input price is socially beneficial if it prevents vertical separation.
    關聯: 經濟研究 56(2)，頁243-266
    显示于类别:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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