淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/119079
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 64178/96951 (66%)
Visitors : 10943926      Online Users : 20930
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
    •  Adv. Search
    Home ‧ Login ‧ Upload ‧ Help ‧ About ‧ Administer Goto mobile version


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/119079


    Title: Vertical Separation and Collusion
    Authors: 高國峯;陳金盛
    Keywords: Vertical Separation;Trigger Strategy;Collusion
    Date: 2020-07-31
    Issue Date: 2020-09-17 12:12:04 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This paper examines an integrated firm’s incentive to undertake vertical separation with forward-looking behavior. In an infinitely repeated game we show that tacit collusion among firms in a final good market is more likely to be sustained under vertical separation than under vertical integration. The integrated firm tends to vertically separate its business if the discount factor is
    at a medium level and the input price is sufficiently low. Finally, an increase in the input price is socially beneficial if it prevents vertical separation.
    Relation: 經濟研究 56(2)，頁243-266
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics] Journal Article

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    Vertical Separation and Collusion.pdf799KbAdobe PDF5View/Open

    All items in 機構典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - Feedback