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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/119079

    Title: Vertical Separation and Collusion
    Authors: Kao, Kuo-Feng;Chen, Chin-Sheng
    Keywords: Vertical Separation;Trigger Strategy;Collusion
    Date: 2020-07-31
    Issue Date: 2020-09-17 12:12:04 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This paper examines an integrated firm’s incentive to undertake vertical separation with forward-looking behavior. In an infinitely repeated game we show that tacit collusion among firms in a final good market is more likely to be sustained under vertical separation than under vertical integration. The integrated firm tends to vertically separate its business if the discount factor is
    at a medium level and the input price is sufficiently low. Finally, an increase in the input price is socially beneficial if it prevents vertical separation.
    Relation: Taipei Economic Inquiry 56(2), p.243-266
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics] Journal Article

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