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    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/118133

    题名: Principal-Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story
    作者: Sobol, Mor
    日期: 2015-10
    上传时间: 2020-02-25 12:10:42 (UTC+8)
    摘要: Principal–agent (PA) has come a long way since it was introduced to the political science sphere. Nowadays, PA has established itself as an institutional midrange theoretical framework that encompasses various methodological as well as theoretical approaches. This article argues, however, that scholars still assume, a priori, that the agent is an opportunistic and disloyal actor. This article seeks to question this theoretical assumption by demonstrating how principals could be as much problematic as their agents, a phenomenon that it terms “pathological delegation.” In so doing, it offers a first analysis of the small strand of the literature that examines problems embedded in the principals' side as well as provides new empirical evidence in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Finally, the article posits that scholars should not treat pathological delegation as an anomaly but rather attempt to integrate, test, and develop new theoretical assumptions on this phenomenon.
    關聯: Governance 29(3), p.335-350
    DOI: 10.1111/gove.12174
    显示于类别:[外交與國際關係學系全英語學士班] 期刊論文


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