| 摘要: | Over the years, opinion polls have shown that the majority of Taiwanese support the cross-strait “status quo”. According to Putnam (1988), the result of international negotiations is subject to the consent of the nationally recognized program before being effective, unless this win-set is not satisfied with the status quo and wish to change it. Based on this, the future of cross-strait CBMs shall be subject to the public’s recognition that the win-sets is better than the status quo and their willingness to change. Although both governments have not yet specifically touched CBMs or military mutual trust mechanisms, academia, think tanks, and retired generals, including those in the U.S., have focused on these issues. The negotiations will require the interaction between the internal domestic and external conditions, or vice versa. From the point of view of policy negotiations, prior preparation and analysis work is necessary in order to build an internal consensus among policymakers. This article uses the concept of Putnam's two-level game and scenario analysis to explore the following three questions: First, regarding the cross-strait political situation, what are the preferences for “Mil-CBMs”? Second, considering the different decision-making systems, how will this affect negotiations for “Mil-CBMs”? Third, what strategic directions will both sides take toward establishing “Mil-CBMs” in future negotiations? In order to simplify the analysis of the negotiations in this case, this article does not deal with third-party intervention, such as the possibility of participating. |
