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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/116757

    Title: CEO overconfidence and shadow-banking life insurer performance under government purchases of distressed assets
    Authors: Shi Chen;Jyh-Horng Lin;Wenyu Yao;Fu-Wei Huang
    Keywords: profit-sharing life insurance policy;CEO overconfidence;shadow-banking transaction
    Date: 2019-03-05
    Issue Date: 2019-05-25 12:10:15 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: MDPI
    Abstract: In this paper, we develop a contingent claim model to evaluate the equity, default risk,
    and efficiency gain/loss from managerial overconfidence of a shadow-banking life insurer under the
    purchases of distressed assets by the government. Our paper focuses on managerial overconfidence
    where the chief executive officer (CEO) overestimates the returns on investment. The investment
    market faced by the life insurer is imperfectly competitive, and investment is core to the provision of
    profit-sharing life insurance policies. We show that CEO overconfidence raises the default risk in the
    life insurer’s equity returns, thereby adversely affecting the financial stability. Either shadow-banking
    involvement or government bailout attenuates the unfavorable effect. There is an efficiency gain from
    CEO overconfidence to investment. Government bailout helps to reduce the life insurer’s default risk,
    but simultaneously reduce the efficiency gain from CEO overconfidence. Our results contribute to the
    managerial overconfidence literature linking insurer shadow-banking involvement and government
    bailout in particular during a financial crisis.
    Relation: Special issue Financial Risks and Regulation 7(1), 28
    DOI: 10.3390/risks7010028
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of International Business] Journal Article

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