| 題名: | Corporate Transparency and Reserve Management: Evidence from US Property-Liability Insurance Companies |
| 作者: | Sangyong Han;Gene C.Lai;Chia-LingHo |
| 關鍵詞: | Corporate transparency;Financial crisis;Reserve management;SOX |
| 日期: | 2018-11 |
| 上傳時間: | 2019-04-30 12:10:21 (UTC+8) |
| 出版者: | Elsevier |
| 摘要: | Using a sample of US publicly traded property-liability insurers, we examine the effect of corporate transparency on earnings management. We find that a higher level of corporate transparency is associated with more conservative loss-reserves estimation. Our evidence shows that the positive effect of corporate transparency on insurers’ reserves-estimate conservatism is more pronounced for insurers that are smaller and have more diversified lines of business and that certain board characteristics—such as being smaller, meeting more frequently, and having a higher percentage of independent directors—can restrain the inadequate reserves management of less transparent US publicly traded property-liability insurers. We also provide evidence that additional regulatory mandates to seek greater transparency in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be redundant, given the existing regulations in the property-liability insurance industry. Finally, we find insurers’ conservative reserve estimates were more pronounced during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. |
| 關聯: | Journal of Banking & Finance 96, p.379-392 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.017 |
| 顯示於類別: | [風險管理與保險學系] 期刊論文
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