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    题名: How Does Distress Acquisition Incentivized by Government Purchases of Distressed Loans Affect Bank Default Risk?
    作者: Jyh-Jiuan Lin;Chuen-Ping Chang;Shi Chen
    日期: 2018-04-19
    上传时间: 2018-09-18 12:11:05 (UTC+8)
    出版者: MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland
    摘要: The topic of bank default risk in connection with government bailouts has recently attracted a great deal of attention. In this paper, the question of how a bank’s default risk is affected by a distress acquisition is investigated. Specifically, the government provides a bailout program of distressed loan purchases for a strong bank to acquire a bank in distress. The acquirer bank may likely refuse the acquisition with a bailout when the amount of distressed loan purchases is large or the knock-out value of the acquired bank is high. When the acquirer bank realizes acquisition gains, the default risk in the consolidated bank’s equity return is negatively related to loan purchases, but positively to the knock-out value of the acquired bank. The government bailout, as such, in large part contributes to banking stability.
    關聯: Risks 6(2), 39
    DOI: 10.3390/risks6020039
    显示于类别:[統計學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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