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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/114417

    Title: 不同生命週期下核心代理問題對高階經理人薪酬之影響 : 以電子業為例
    Other Titles: The effect of core agency problem on managers' remuneration under different life cycles : a case study on electronic industry
    Authors: 謝佑承;Xie, You-Cheng
    Contributors: 淡江大學會計學系碩士班
    張雅淇;Chang, Ya-Chi
    Keywords: Core Agency Problem;Life Cycle;Remuneration;生命週期;核心代理問題;薪酬
    Date: 2017
    Issue Date: 2018-08-03 14:51:53 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文旨在探討我國上市櫃公司之高階經理人薪酬與核心代理問題之關聯,並進一步的探討兩者的關聯程度在不同的生命週期下是否會有所影響。本文參考Anthony and Ramesh(1992)方法並使用金成隆(2005)之作法以研發密度取代股利支付率作為生命週期判別因子,並以我國2009年至2016年之上市櫃電子產業公司做為樣本,進行實證分析。實證結果發現,席次偏離差對我國電子產業高階經理人薪酬顯著正影響,而高階經理人薪酬在成長期所受到核心代理問題之影響比成熟期與衰退期小,而衰退期之高階經理人薪酬受到核心代理問題影響比期成熟期更大。
    This paper aims to discuss the relationship between managers’ remuneration and core agency problem in Taiwan, and measure whether the degree of association was affected by the life cycle. Based on the methodology in the studies of Chen-Lung Chin (2005), using R&D intensity, sales growth, capital spending rate, firm age as factors to determine the different stages of the life cycle. The study employs data of the firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange during 2009-2015. The results show that the core agent problem has significant positive effect on managers'' remuneration of the electronics industry. In addition, regarding the seats deviation as the agent variable of the core agent problem to explore this effect during different stages of the life cycle, the results indicate that the core agent problem has significant negative on managers'' remuneration at growth stage, while it shows significant positive on managers'' remuneration at both maturity stage and decline stage. To be more precise, the effect at the growth stage is minimal throughout the life cycle, however the effect at the decline stage is maximal.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Accounting] Thesis

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