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    Title: 股價對油價變動的敏感度與公司治理對公司價值影響
    Other Titles: Exploring the sensitivity of stock prices to oil prices and corporate governance on firm value
    Authors: 曾琮盛;Tseng, Tsung-Sheng
    Contributors: 淡江大學管理科學學系碩士班
    倪衍森;Ni, Yen-Sen
    Keywords: corporate governance;firm value;The Sensitive of Oil Prices;公司治理;公司價值;油價敏感度
    Date: 2017
    Issue Date: 2018-08-03 14:48:09 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究樣本為2010至2015年台灣證交所上市公司,欲探討股價對油價的敏感度、公司治理變數及財務變數對公司價值是否會有影響性。本研究從實證結果得到以下發現:其一、股價對油價敏感度越高之公司,其公司價值亦越高。亦即在油價波動時,公司在避險及成本控管上做得更好,故表現較其他公司更佳。其二、董監事及經理人持股具正向顯著關係,表示公司高層對自家公司較具信心,對未來的績效表現樂觀,且自身利益與公司具有高度關聯性,是以較能積極管理並致力於公司的未來的發展。其三、在公司市值及資產週轉率皆呈正向顯著關係,表示公司規模越大與資產利用效率越好的公司,其公司價值越佳。其四、董事會規模和董監事質押比率對公司價值呈現負向顯著關係,表示董事會規模越大及董監質押比越高,則高質押的公司的董監事可能會做出自利但不利公司的行為且規模大的董事會其意見容易出現分歧而進而影響公司之決策。
    This study is to explore whether the sensitivity of stock prices to oil prices and corporate governance would affect firm for the firms listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange over the period 2010-2015, and to derive the following important findings. First, the firms with higher elasticity of stock prices to oil prices would result in higher firm value. We infer that these firms might prevent costs fluctuations by employing hedging vehicles, which might be beneficial for firm value enhanced. Second, the result reveal that the shareholdings of directors and mangershave positive impacts on firm value, indicating that these firms would have confidences for their own business due to higher shareholdings held by directors and top managers. Third, the firms with higher firms value and higher asset turnover ratio positively affect firm value, indicating that the firms with higher firm scales and better asset management would be beneficial for firm value enhanced. Four, the firms with higher board size and higher pledge ratio would have negative impact on firm value. We infer that the directors with higher pledge ratio might process self-interest activities unfavorable to firm value enhanced. In addition, the large board size might be easy to have divergent opinions on the board, which might affect the quality of decision-making on the board.
    Appears in Collections:[管理科學學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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