本研究旨在探討台灣上市櫃公司董監事責任險與風險承擔的關聯性，並以公司治理的角色進行研究及分析。由於過去文獻指出公司對董監事責任險的需求會受到許多因素影響，例如，公司治理特性。為解決此內生性問題，本文採用兩階段最小平方法(two-stage least square method, 2SLS)估計迴歸模型，第一階段模型驗證董監事責任保險需求與公司治理關聯性，第二階段探討風險承擔與董監事責任險之關聯性。實證結果顯示，董監事責任險的投保需求會受到公司治理因素影響；董事長兼任總經理、董事會獨立性及經理人持股均對董監事責任險投保需求有正向顯著影響，而董事會規模及大股東持股對董監事責任險投保需求有負向顯著影響，且董監事責任險對公司風險承擔呈現顯著的正向影響，表示投保董監事責任險會使企業擴大風險承擔。此外，本研究以董監事責任險投保金額進行驗證，實證結果亦支持董監事責任險投保金額與風險承擔呈現顯著的正向影響。 The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) and risk taking in Taiwan listed companies from the role of corporate governance. Prior literatures suggest that the demand of D&O insurance is likely affected by many factors, such as corporate governance characteristics. To solve this endogenous problem, we adopted two-stage least square method (2SLS) to estimate our empirical models. The first stage model is to examine the relationship between the demand of D&O insurance and corporate governance. The second stage model is to examine the relationship between risk taking and the demand of D&O insurance. The empirical results show that the demand of D&O insurance will be influenced by corporate governance factors. CEO duality, board independence and manager shares have significant positive impact on the demand of D&O insurance; whereas board size and block shares have significant negative impact on the demand of D&O Insurance. D&O insurance has a significant positive impact on corporate risk taking indicating that the purchase of D&O insurance will lead to greater risk taking. In addition, we testified our models by the amount of D&O insurance. The results also support the significant positive impact on corporate risk taking.