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    題名: 「作戰藝術」研究分析模型之建構 : 理論與實務
    其他題名: A study on creating the analysis model of "operational art" : theory and practice
    作者: 滕昕雲;Teng, Hsin-Yun
    貢獻者: 淡江大學國際事務與戰略研究所博士班
    施正權;Shih, Cheng-chuan
    關鍵詞: firepower;maneuver;military doctrine;operational art;operational level of war;火力;作戰階層;作戰藝術;軍事準則;機動
    日期: 2017
    上傳時間: 2018-08-03 14:35:41 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 戰爭理論中,界定戰爭之行為傳統上僅有戰略與戰術兩個層級。隨著工藝技術的精進,通信與運輸手段的推陳出新,造成戰爭的時空因素均不斷的擴張。為因應此一現象,軍事戰略理論家們便在戰略與戰術之間,新擴增了「作戰階層」,而指導野戰部隊在「作戰階層」的調度與運用的原理,便是「作戰藝術」。
    作戰藝術之緣起,來自於戰爭要素中「火力」與「機動」的辯證。當位於絕對位置中之敵我雙方部隊之相對位置的辯證關係中,當戰爭的「火力」因素大過「機動」因素時,則雙方的戰爭行為將是「戰術性」;而當「機動」因素大過「火力」因素時,則雙方的戰爭行為即是「作戰階層屬性」。吾人即依此一原則制定檢證軍事行動是否為「作戰藝術」之於「作戰階層」發揚的分析模型。
    20世紀初德國元帥希里芬所提出的「希里芬計畫」,講求運用強大右翼在遼闊空間之長途快速行軍,以殲滅法國野戰軍於法德國境。本案「機動」因素大於「火力」因素,是為純然之作戰藝術於作戰階層之發揚,但在1914年夏小毛奇實際運用時,卻因當時工藝技術之限制,步兵徒步行軍的形式無法掌握至大的空間,而告失敗。一次世界大戰的西線塹壕戰僵局,即是「火力」超越「機動」的後果,導致戰爭衍生成消耗戰形式的靜態線性戰爭。
    二次世界大戰時,由於機械化裝甲部隊的採用,軍隊已經可以在至短的時間內,掌握至大的空間,也就是說,機動因素能夠超越火力因素。二次大戰德軍所實施的閃擊戰,也就是「作戰階層的機動作戰」的一種展現。作戰階層機動作戰的實踐,讓德軍能夠藉由機動戰來實踐殲滅會戰,徹底顛覆了一次大戰那種缺乏決定性又耗資費時的消耗戰戰爭型態,而讓戰爭的形貌出現革命性的翻轉。
    蘇聯紅軍為了實踐「作戰藝術」在「作戰階層」的發揚,於1920/30年代創建了「縱深作戰」陸戰理論,強調在開戰之初,不但要與第一線的敵軍接觸,還要殲滅其後方梯隊與支援其作戰的一切設施;其手段即是以深遠的機動來涵蓋作戰階層縱深之空間。「縱深作戰」經過蘇聯紅軍於二次大戰的實戰驗證,復在冷戰時期經由新的工藝技術予以精進,更提出「作戰階層機動群」的新銳戰法,成為當時美軍與北約的心腹大患。美軍為了克制蘇軍「作戰階層機動群」戰法,提出了「陸空整體作戰」的軍事準則。「陸空整體作戰」強調以戰區之縱深打擊火力,來作為美軍「作戰階層」軍事行動的實踐,卻不免因在設計上讓「火力」大過「機動」,而有陷入消耗戰屬性之虞。
    1991年波灣戰爭開啟了資訊時代高科技戰爭的開端。運用大規模數位資訊科技,以獲取戰場全然之透明度,打破戰爭之霧,並提升遠距精準打擊火力的殲敵效能,這就成為新時代戰爭的型態。資訊時代高科技戰爭的諸多構想,其所形塑之若干新的戰爭原則,有貶抑「作戰階層」的趨勢。然而2003年的第二次波灣戰爭的陸上戰役顯示,即便在新的「網狀化作戰」的實施下,傳統陸戰的基本原理,仍然在時機成熟之際浮現,深刻影響了作戰進程的發展。作戰藝術之於作戰階層的發揚,仍在現代高科技戰爭中佔有不可磨滅的一席之地。
    Traditionally, military theories define war behaviors at two levels: strategic and tactical. As technology advances, new communication and transport methods are introduced and extends the time and space of wars. Military strategy theorists thus added one level, “operational level of war”, to the strategic and tactical levels, and “operational art” is the theory guiding the dispatch and use of field troops at the “operational level of war”.
    The dialectics between “firepower” and “mobility” among military factors are the origins of operational art. In the dialectics of the relative position of both formations in an absolute position, the military status of both camps will be “tactical” when “firepower” overwhelms “mobility”, while such status will be at the “operational level” when “mobility” overwhelms “firepower”. Based on this principle, this study establishes an analysis model to verify if “operational art” is an amplification of the “operational level of war” in a military operation.
    The “Schlieffen Plan” devised by German Field Marshall von Schlieffen at the beginning of the 20th century emphasized the use of a long and quick march over a spacious area of a powerful right wing to annihilate French field troops on the Franco-German border. As “mobility” overwhelms “firepower” in this case, the plan is considered as an amplification of operational art at the operational level of war. However, when Moltke the Younger applied this plan in the summer of 1914, it was a failure as infantries could not control a huge space by foot due to the limit of technology at that time. The deadlock of the trench war on the Western Frontier in WWI is the result of “firepower” overwhelming “mobility”. In results, the war turned out to be a static linear warfare derived from attrition warfare.
    In WWII, the rise of mechanized armored troops enabled troops to control a spacious area within a short time. That is to say, mobility can overwhelm firepower. The lightening warfare (Blitzkrieg) implemented by the German army in WWII is a demonstration of the “mobile operation at the operational level”. The practice of mobile operation at the operational level enabled the German army to realize annihilative pitched battles with mobile operation, and completely overthrew the undetermined and time-consuming attrition warfare in WWI, and brought a revolution of military affairs.
    To amplify “operational art” at the “operational level of war”, the Red Army devised the “deep operations” land warfare in the 1920s to 1930s. This theory emphasizes the engagement with the front-line combat troops and annihilation of the echelons and all supportive facilities behind simultaneously. This way of operation covers the deep areas at the operational level of war through far-reaching mobility. After the Red Army experimented with the “deep operations” in WWII, this warfare theory was optimized during the Cold War as technology advanced. The Red Army further proposed a novel warfare called “operational maneuver group” which was then the mortal enemy to the US Army and NATO. To overcome the operational maneuver group of the Red Army, the US Army proposed the “AirLand Battle” military doctrine emphasizing the realization of the “operational level of war” with the deep strike by firepower in the warzone. However, this doctrine is at risk of attrition for its “firepower” overwhelming “mobility” in design.
    The Gulf War of 1991 marks the onset of high-tech warfare in the Information Age. Under this warfare, information and communication technology (ICT) is extensively used to obtain total battlefield transparency to remove the fog of war and enhance the annihilation performance of long-range precision firepower strikes, thus becoming the warfare for the new era. Some new war principles shaped by many high-tech war ideas in the Information Age tend to derogate the “operational level of war”. Based on the land war in the Second Gulf War of 2003, the basic principles of traditional land war emerged and deeply affected the development of the war process in the right timing, even the new “network centric warfare” was implemented. Operational art as an amplification of the operational level of war still plays an irreplaceable role in modern high-tech warfare.
    顯示於類別:[國際事務與戰略研究所] 學位論文

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