本論文的目的是評估中國於2001至2010年期間在非洲大陸的援助分配，其動機到底是基於自利或利他主義作為主要驅動力，並找出為什麼在個別非洲國家之間，獲得中國的援助金額有很大差距的原因。論文建立在過去關於外國援助方面的研究，即其理論框架和運用特定變數進行檢定，並應用於中國對非洲的援助上。本論文開發並採用一個多元迴歸模型，檢定9個不同變數與中國對非洲個別國家提供（已實施或已承諾）的人均援助金額之間的關係，變數的選擇是基於之前對外援助方面的研究成果。變數項目包括嬰兒死亡率、政治和公民自由以及政府效率指標作為受援國利益相關的變數，資源租金占GDP的百分比、聯合國投票結盟、承認臺灣與否和中國雙邊出口當為變數來代表捐助國的利益，人口作為「混合」的變數，暴力衝突則表示控制變數。就研究發現而言，論文證實自利是決定中國對外援助分配的首要驅動力，即在經濟利益領域─主要與天然資源的提取相關，在一定程度上也和中國對非洲國家的出口有關。另一方面，大部分結果表明在中國的援助分配中，政治動機缺乏影響力，中國也不重視受援國的需求。論文所使用的模型可以解釋一半以上中國在非洲援助的變化，在統計上可以說是顯著的。因此，論文支持這樣的觀點：儘管不可能增加非洲大陸上的政治競爭，中國對非洲的援助主要是為自我利益而努力。 The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the aid allocation motives of China on African continent in the period of 2001-2010 with respect to the selfishness or altruism being the main driving force and to find out why there are such a big differences between the individual African countries in terms of amount of aid received from China. The thesis builds on the previous research in the sphere of foreign aid, namely the theoretical grounding and use of particular variables for testing, and applies it to the topic of Chinese aid in Africa. The thesis develops and uses a multiple regression model that tests relationship of 9 different variables to the per capita amount of aid given (implemented or committed) by China to the individual African countries; selection of the variables was based on the previous studies conducted in the field of foreign aid. The variables comprise the infant mortality rate, political and civil liberties and government effectivity index as variables related to the interests of the recipients, resource rent expressed in % of GDP, UN voting alignments, recognition of Taiwan and Chinese bilateral exports as variables indicating an interest of the donor, population as "mixed" variable and presence of a violent conflict as a control variable. In terms of findings, the thesis confirms self-interest as being the primary driving force determining Chinese aid allocation, namely in the sphere of economic interest - mainly relating to extraction of natural resources and, to a certain degree, China''s exports to African countries. On the other hand, the results largely show an absence of political motivations as being influential in China''s aid allocation, as well as an indifference with respect to the recipient need. The model used can explain over than half of the variation present in Chinese aid allocation in Africa and can thus be seen as significant. The thesis thus supports the view that Chinese aid is mainly self-interested endeavor, although not likely to increase political competition on the African continent.