Input price discrimination, technology licensing and social welfare

機構典藏 > College of Business and Management > Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics > Journal Article > Item 987654321/112534

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/112534

Title:	Input price discrimination, technology licensing and social welfare
Authors:	Kuo-Feng Kao;Hong Hwang
Keywords:	Price discrimination;Technology licensing;Vertically related markets;Social welfare
Date:	2017-11
Issue Date:	2018-01-03 02:10:53 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	This paper examines the welfare effect of third-degree input price discrimination in the presence of technology licensing by an outside innovator. It is found that discriminatory pricing induces the innovator to issue more licenses to downstream firms which improves the overall production efficiency of the downstream market and makes discriminatory pricing more socially desirable than uniform pricing. However, if the level of innovation is endogenously determined by the outside innovator, price discrimination suppresses his R&D incentive, which reduces the social welfare and makes the welfare effect of price discrimination ambiguous.
Relation:	International Review of Economics and Finance 52, p.446-456
DOI:	10.1016/j.iref.2017.03.006
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics] Journal Article

Files in This Item:

File	Description	Size	Format
index.html		0Kb	HTML	213	View/Open
Input price discrimination, technology licensing and social welfare.pdf		329Kb	Adobe PDF	1	View/Open