|Abstract: || 1978年12月15日美國單方面宣布將於1979年1月1日與中華民國斷交，轉而與中華人民共和國建交。美國與中華民國間規範兩國同盟軍事合作關係的「中美共同防禦條約」也將於1979年12月31日正式終止，屆時兩國間將無任何條款來規範彼此的關係。自美國宣布斷交訊息後，美方便積極地制定一個能規範台灣間關係的依據，透過國會的努力，「台灣關係法」正式在1979年4月10日由卡特總統簽署，成為美國正式的法律。「台灣關係法」直自今日一直是台美兩方關係互動最重要的根據。|
The main purpose of this thesis is to use Allison and Zelikow’s three models to analyze how different factors affected the legislation of the TRA. On December 15, 1978, the U.S. government unilaterally announced to break formal diplomatic relations with the ROC, and switched to make formal diplomatic relations with the PRC in January 1, 1979. At that time, however, “Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty” would be terminated by December 31, 1979. At that time, there was no formal law to define or regulate the relations between Taiwan and the U.S. After the U.S. government announced to break the diplomatic ties with the ROC, the U.S. tried hard to construct a new law to maintain the relationship between Taiwan and the United States. After striving for some time, the U.S. Congress legislated the “Taiwan Relations Act (TRA),” and President Jimmy Carter signed it into a federal law on April 10, 1979. Thus, the TRA then became a foundation regulating the relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. after 1979.
By applying Graham Allison and Zelikow’s three decision-making models, namely, Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organization Behavior Model (OBM), and Government Politics Model (GPM), this study will analyze the legislation of the TRA from the perspective of rationalism, operation of the organization and the competition between important governmental units.
By applying RAM in Chapter Three, this study finds that the changing position of the U.S. was the result of the international situation at that time. On the one hand, the U.S. needed the PRC to break the deadlock in its relations with the Soviet Union. But, on the other hand, the U.S. couldn’t let Taiwan go. As a result, the U.S. government proposed a legislation to maintain its relationship with Taiwan. By applying OBM in Chapter Four, this research finds that the Congress had successfully used its power authorized by the Constitution to legislate the TRA, and by following the SOPs of legislation, the TRA was signed into public law on April 4, 1979. In Chapter Five, this research analyzes the attitude of the U.S. Congress, DOS and NSC toward the legislation of TRA, and finds that the U.S. Congress was the key character in the legislation of TRA, although both the DOS and the NSC were important in the legislation of TRA, the U.S. Congress was the most important legislative brunch according to the U.S. Constitution. As a result, the Senators and the representatives of the House played more important roles than DOS and NSC officials in the decision-making process of the legislation of TRA.
The United States, as a country showing respect to realism, would make the decision which could maximize its national interest in the legislation of the TRA. Since the U.S. Congress is the primary legislative brunch; therefore, it was the key character in the legislation of the TRA. So were its Senators and representatives of the House. Therefore, the main theme of this thesis is that the U.S. federal government, as a whole, decided to make good use of the legislation of the TRA to maximize its national interest; the U.S. Congress, as the primary legislative brunch of the federal government, played the most important role among related governmental agencies in the process of the legislation of the TRA; the Senators and the representatives of the House played more important roles than DOS and NSC officials in the decision-making process of the legislation of TRA.