The U.S. role in the decision-making process of the creation of the World Bank (1941 to 1944)

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Title:	The U.S. role in the decision-making process of the creation of the World Bank (1941 to 1944)
Other Titles:	美國在建立世界銀行決策過程之角色(1941-1944)
Authors:	范育瑄;Fan, Yu-Shiuan
Contributors:	淡江大學美洲研究所碩士班陳一新
Keywords:	世界銀行;決策理論;羅斯福政府;國際復興與開發銀行;World Bank;Decision-Making Theory;Roosevelt Administration;IBRD
Date:	2016
Issue Date:	2017-08-24 23:59:39 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本論文主要目的為了解，羅斯福政府為何自1941年起，並於1944年成功遊說英國接受美方的提議，即建立世界銀行及國際貨幣基金以解決戰後經濟與金融危機；並傾向由財政部而非國務院主導1944年布列敦森林協定之會議；且總統更加信任財政部長摩根索，全權負起建立此兩個金融組織之重責大任。羅斯福總統認為美國必須領導聯盟國家，建立兩個金融組織：國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)與國際復興開發銀行(IBRD)，也稱作世界銀行，進而主導戰後經濟與金融危機。美國方面提出的兩個國際金融機構，主張以美元作為戰後的儲備貨幣，透過國際貿易，直至全球的黃金供恢復正常。儘管於戰間時期，美國與英國互為友好聯盟，雙方仍於許多議題上意見大為相左。從理性行為者模式而論，華盛頓政府堅持戰後建立兩個國際金融組織，以因應戰後全球經濟與金融問題。然而，倫敦政府確信國際清算聯盟(ICU)，足以應付戰後金融及重建危機。但對美國而言，英國經濟學者凱因斯提出的計畫書中，國際清算聯盟僅僅提出如何製造貨幣進而平衡國際清償能力，特別是英國的債務平衡。因此，美國認為其提議僅以英國利益為主要目的。換言之，與國際清算聯盟一同建立的虛擬貨幣『班克(bancor)』即是以英國利益為主，而非美國國家利益為考量。從組織行為模式而論，在戰後的財政與投資政策部分，由於財政部主要負責傳統的經濟和金融事務，因此比起國務院，羅斯福總統更加信任財政部；也因為財政部有較多經融與財政專家及專業人才，有更多處理財政事務的經驗。更有甚者，與財政部熱烈的競爭當中，國務院在經濟與金融政策的領域裡，失去相抗衡的能力，大抵是因為國務院的組織文化並非經濟與金融導向。從政府政治模式而論，財政部長摩根索與羅斯福為很要好的朋友，而國務卿赫爾僅是羅斯福的普通友人，任命國務卿一職。由於摩根索有一位得力助手-財政部長助理哈里懷特，是戰後經濟與金融計畫藍圖的主導者，深得羅斯福的重視。再者，由於摩根索與總統有深厚的家庭淵源，有更多的優勢能接觸到總統；反觀，赫爾僅是總統與摩根索及美國駐外大使的傳話者。綜整觀之，二戰甫結束，國際間建立世界銀行的過程中，美國成功地說服英國同意接受美方提出之提案，即成立國際復興與開發銀行(世界銀行)以及國際貨幣基金兩個機構，進而解決戰後重建與金融問題；而美國財政部相較起國務院而言，更加有影響力及主導權，由於財政部擁有經濟與金融導向的組織文化，經濟金融專業人才及過去藉由組織標準作業規範所累積的成的相關經驗；同時，也可看出財政部長摩根索更能直接影響總統的決策，而國務卿赫爾在此次財經決策過程較不具有太大的影響力。 The main purpose of this thesis is to explore why Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) decided to convince the United Kingdom (UK) during 1941-1944 to accept the creation of the World Bank (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to tackle the postwar economic and financial crises, chose the Department of Treasury (DoT) rather than the Department of State (DoS) in arranging the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, and placed his personal trust in Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. rather than State Secretary Cordell Hull to take full responsibility in the creation of the two financial and monetary institutions. FDR envisioned that the U.S. should lead its allies to establish a Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development so that the United States could manage the postwar economic and financial crises. In both international financial agencies, it was proposed that American dollar would be the postwar new-reserved currency until the world’s gold supply was re-allocated through international trade. Although they were close allies during the war, the American and British Governments disagreed on a variety of issues. From the perspective of Rational Actor Model (RAM), Washington insisted that the postwar world must create two international agencies to tackle its postwar economic and financial problems, whereas London believed that the International Clearing Union (ICU) would be sufficient to manage the postwar financial and reconstruction crises. In the eyes of the U.S., Lord John Maynard Keynes’ proposal simply provided the proposed ICU with a method of creating money that could be used in settling these balances, British balances in particular. The U.S. thus believed that such an arrangement would only be favorable to the U.K. In other words, the creation of bancor, which is a supranational currency, might be in the interest of the UK, it was not in the interest of the U.S. From the perspective of Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), President Roosevelt placed more trust in DoT than DoS on the postwar monetary and investment policies in part because the DoT was an organization in charge of routine economic and financial affairs. The DoT gained the upper hand over the DoS because the former had more economic and financial experts and more professional expertise and practical experience in tackling monetary and financial affairs than did the latter. The tension between the DoS and the DoT was reflected in their sharp intelligence warfare in particular. More importantly, in keen competition with the DoT, the DoS lost most of its battlegrounds in the economic and financial policies largely because the organizational culture of State Department was not finance-oriented. From the perspective of Governmental Politics Model (GPM), Treasury Secretary Morgenthau was the closest friend of President Roosevelt, whereas Secretary Hull was only the President’s friend chosen to be the Secretary of State. Morgenthau was a man FDR could not afford to ignore largely because he had his assistant Harry Dexter White to design an economic and financial blueprint in the postwar years. Moreover, Secretary Morgenthau had better access to FDR than did Secretary Hull. Furthermore, Secretary Hull, in most cases, was nothing but a messenger between Secretary Morgenthau and U.S. ambassadors in foreign countries. The main theme of this thesis is that the U.S successfully convinced the UK to accept the creation of the IBRD (World Bank) and the IMF to manage the postwar reconstruction and financial affairs; the Department of Treasury was more influential than the Department of State as a result of its organizational culture, financial experts and expertise in the economic and financial arenas; Treasury Secretary Morgenthau enjoyed better access to and more influence on FDR than did State Secretary Hull.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute of the Americas] Thesis

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