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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/111070

    Title: 獨立董事與管理階層之社會性連結對董事監督及諮詢角色之影響
    Other Titles: The effects of social ties between independent directors and executive officers on the board effectiveness
    Authors: 張凱婷;Chang, Kai-Ting
    Contributors: 淡江大學會計學系碩士班
    孔繁華;Kung, Fan-Hua
    Keywords: 公司治理;獨立董事;社會性連結;董事會功能;corporate governance;independent directors;Social ties;Board effectiveness
    Date: 2016
    Issue Date: 2017-08-24 23:43:07 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究以獨立董事是否實質獨立為探討主題,深入了解獨立董事與管理階層間的社會性連結是否會影響獨立董事執行職務之效能。獨立性乃企業設立獨立董事之最主要關鍵,兩者間存在社會性連結時,獨立董事執行監督角色時,可能因為彼此有關聯性或是情誼上的連結,造成監督之缺失;又公司能利用獨立董事之專業性,透過獨立董事與管理者的情誼或關係,更促進兩者的溝通及瞭解,藉此更清楚企業的內部作業,提供專業適合企業的建議,發揮其諮詢功能。本研究以 2013 至 2014 年國內上市櫃公司為樣本,並針對已設置獨立董事公司之獨立董事與管理者間之社會性連結資料,以人工方式進行判讀。本研究結果顯示,使用裁決性應計項目及查核報告意見書所測試之獨立董事監督效果係存在的,可以看出兩者具有經歷社會性連結有利於董事會監督效能;另外使用資產報酬率測試獨立董事諮詢之效果時會發現獨立董事與總經理具有社會性連結時會呈顯著負相關,表示兩者間具有關係時不存在諮詢效果。而使用股東權益報酬率衡量諮詢效果時,表示兩者間具有社會性連結對董事會諮詢職能具有顯著幫助。額外測試部分,本研究以總經理任期之內選任獨立董事來衡量其代表具有社會性連結,結果顯示在總經理任期之內選任之獨立董事確實會對董事會監督職能造成負面影響;諮詢部分則以股東權益報酬率呈現顯著正相關,表示在總經理任期之內選任之獨立董事確實會對董事會諮詢職能有幫助。本研究將社會性連結以獨立董事與該公司查核之事務所作為衡量基礎,監督效果部分,查核報告意見書所衡量之監督效果呈現顯著負相關,諮詢部分為顯著正相關,表示其兩者間具有事務所之連結,對董事會之諮詢及監督功能是有幫助的。綜合上述結果,我們發現整體獨立董事的連結性並不會造成太大的影響, 但將其連結性進一步分析後發現獨立董事的連結性對於其諮詢及監督角色確實會造成影響。
    The objective of this study is to investigate the independence of independent directors, deeply understanding of whether the social ties between independence directors and executive officers will affect the monitoring and advising roles of boards of directors. Independence is the most important key enterprises to set up independent directors. When the company exists social ties, independent directors to perform oversight role probably cannot actual independence to oversight the company because there is another association link cause of the lack of supervision. But the company can take independent directors’ advantage of professional, independent directors through friendship or relationship with the manager, but also to promote communication and understanding between independent directors and managers, thereby more clearly the company''s internal operations to provide professional recommendations for the enterprise, to play its advisory function. In this study, the sample is from listed and OTC companies is all collected by hands from 2013 to 2014 in Taiwan. The results showed that independent directors with social ties belongs to the department of supervised effect, CEO represents the link with the independent directors of the advisory function does not exist, it may cause a negative effect on the company. But after additional testing also found that if CEO within the term of office of independent directors elected, CEO of the effect of supervision is non-existent, and advisory role with the general manager in Taiwan presented a positive effect. And we change CEO to CFO, the result founds no effect to supervision and advisory role. Finally we check the link of independent directors and the firm, the result shows the link will let the supervision and advisory function get better.
    Based on the results, we found that the overall link between independent directors and will not cause much impact, but further analyze the link between independent directors with social ties will affect its advisory and oversight role.
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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