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    Title: 台灣上市櫃公司核心代理問題之研究
    Other Titles: A study of core agency problem in Taiwan
    Authors: 洪嘉穗;Hung, Chia-Sui
    Contributors: 淡江大學會計學系碩士在職專班
    黃振豊;孔繁華
    Keywords: 核心代理問題;控制權;盈餘分配權;Core Agent Problem;control;Authority of Surplus Distribution
    Date: 2016
    Issue Date: 2017-08-24 23:42:49 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究主要在調查台灣上市櫃公司的核心代理問題;並探討不同企業控制型態下,影響核心代理問題的相關因素是否有所差異。由於我國股權結構的特殊、家族企業濃厚色彩的經營方式,以及控制股東利用金字塔結構與交叉持股來強化控制權,且透過外圍的力量掌控董事會並參與管理,造成控制權與盈餘分配權的偏離。
    本文以股份控制權與盈餘分配權的偏離來衡量控制股東對小股東侵佔財富動機的大小,以席次控制權與盈餘分配權的偏離來衡量控制股東經營誘因與侵佔效果的強弱。調查分析發現,不同控制型態的企業、公司規模以及產業等因素,會影響偏離程度的大小。其中以非家族控制型態的專業經理人偏離程度最大、公司規模愈大的企業偏離程度愈大、電子產業以及證券交易市場上市的企業偏離程度亦較大,而公司績效愈差者其偏離程度也較大。進一步實證分析發現,相較於非家族控制企業,家族企業之股份及席次偏離盈餘的程度較低,表示股權集中的家族企業,有極大的經濟誘因去消除代理衝突。但家族控制股東若以複雜轉投資方式如透過金字塔結構或交叉持股者,將使偏離程度加大,控制股東在自利誘因的驅使下而從事不利於小股東的行為,公司績效亦會較差。另外,本研究發現家族控制企業,其公司績效與席次控制權偏離盈餘分配權是呈現顯著負相關。
    本研究全體樣本家族控制的企業占64.17%,顯然我國所有權與經營權明顯集中,再加上我國控制股東常利用董監席次來強化控制權且較符合成本效益(相較於投票權),表示控制股東的經營決策與出資緊密程度不高。然而國內主管機關在公司監理機制上,僅區分上市及上櫃公司或是產業不同而有所不同的規範,未來建議是否依股權分散程度訂定相關監理機制,以防止控制股東為自身利益而造成小股東及公司的損失。
    The study is to survey the core agent problem of listed companies and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan, and to examine whether there are differences between the factors in affecting core agent problems under different controls of enterprises. Due to the specificities of ownership structure and the operations of family business in Taiwan, the pyramidal structure and cross shareholdings are utilized to control shareholders with strengthened predominance, and as well as the outer forces are employed to control the board of trustees, making deviations of control and the authorities of surplus distribution by direct management participation.
    To evaluate the magnitudes of encroachment of wealth of small shareholders by shareholders, the deviations of shares of control and authorities of surplus distribution are calculated, and to evaluate the strengths of encroachment effects and business incentives of shareholders, the deviations of seats control and authorities of surplus distribution are estimated. The results represent that enterprises with different types of control, the scales of enterprise, and industries would affect the magnitudes of deviation. Professional managers without family controls gives the greatest degree of deviation, and the same appearances would also be emerged in poor corporate performance, electronics industry, and listed companies; the larger the scale of company, the larger the degree of deviation. Furthermore, to compare with the enterprises without family control, the deviations of the surplus of shares and seats of family enterprises are low; it insinuates that family enterprises possess the utmost business incentives to eliminate agent conflicts. On the other hand, the deviation would be expanded when complicated reinvestment approaches such as pyramidal structure or cross shareholdings are utilized, manipulating the shareholders to jeopardize the interests of small shareholders via the spurs of self-interest incentives and making companies fall down in business performance eventually; the business performance is negative correlated to the seat control of the deviation of authorities of surplus distribution in family-control enterprises.
    There are 64.17% of family-control enterprises in the entire samples of study, it reveals that the ownership and franchise are over concentrated and as well as the manipulations of the seats of the board of trustees are usually adopted to intensify the controls of shareholders to accord cost effectiveness, which represents voting rights. The consequences demonstrate the relationships between the control of business decision of shareholders and the investments are low. On the other hand, different regulations are merely based upon the differentiation of listed companies and over-the-counter companies, or distinctions of industries by the supervision mechanism of domestic authorities, the study recommends that the supervision mechanism could be established by the basis of the degree of dispersion of equity, to prevent the losses of small shareholders and enterprises from the captures of shareholders with their self-interests.
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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