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|Other Titles: ||A study of core agency problem in Taiwan|
|Authors: ||洪嘉穗;Hung, Chia-Sui|
|Keywords: ||核心代理問題;控制權;盈餘分配權;Core Agent Problem;control;Authority of Surplus Distribution|
|Issue Date: ||2017-08-24 23:42:49 (UTC+8)|
The study is to survey the core agent problem of listed companies and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan, and to examine whether there are differences between the factors in affecting core agent problems under different controls of enterprises. Due to the specificities of ownership structure and the operations of family business in Taiwan, the pyramidal structure and cross shareholdings are utilized to control shareholders with strengthened predominance, and as well as the outer forces are employed to control the board of trustees, making deviations of control and the authorities of surplus distribution by direct management participation.
To evaluate the magnitudes of encroachment of wealth of small shareholders by shareholders, the deviations of shares of control and authorities of surplus distribution are calculated, and to evaluate the strengths of encroachment effects and business incentives of shareholders, the deviations of seats control and authorities of surplus distribution are estimated. The results represent that enterprises with different types of control, the scales of enterprise, and industries would affect the magnitudes of deviation. Professional managers without family controls gives the greatest degree of deviation, and the same appearances would also be emerged in poor corporate performance, electronics industry, and listed companies; the larger the scale of company, the larger the degree of deviation. Furthermore, to compare with the enterprises without family control, the deviations of the surplus of shares and seats of family enterprises are low; it insinuates that family enterprises possess the utmost business incentives to eliminate agent conflicts. On the other hand, the deviation would be expanded when complicated reinvestment approaches such as pyramidal structure or cross shareholdings are utilized, manipulating the shareholders to jeopardize the interests of small shareholders via the spurs of self-interest incentives and making companies fall down in business performance eventually; the business performance is negative correlated to the seat control of the deviation of authorities of surplus distribution in family-control enterprises.
There are 64.17% of family-control enterprises in the entire samples of study, it reveals that the ownership and franchise are over concentrated and as well as the manipulations of the seats of the board of trustees are usually adopted to intensify the controls of shareholders to accord cost effectiveness, which represents voting rights. The consequences demonstrate the relationships between the control of business decision of shareholders and the investments are low. On the other hand, different regulations are merely based upon the differentiation of listed companies and over-the-counter companies, or distinctions of industries by the supervision mechanism of domestic authorities, the study recommends that the supervision mechanism could be established by the basis of the degree of dispersion of equity, to prevent the losses of small shareholders and enterprises from the captures of shareholders with their self-interests.
|Appears in Collections:||[會計學系暨研究所] 學位論文|
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