本研究以2010到2014年台灣上市公司為研究樣本，探討股權結構變數與財報變數及控制變數，對法人持股變化及融資融券水位變化之影響。本研究從實證結果得到以下發現：其一、高負債與董事會規模大的公司比較會被視為公司治理有問題的公司，而這些公司通常不是外資青睞的標的。其二、高董監事持股的企業一般被認為有較好的公司治理，所以此可能為投信增加持股的重要考量因素。其三、由於自營商比較屬於短進短出的投資機構，所以涉及基本面的財報變數與公司治理面的股權結構因素，反而不是自營商增加持股的重要因素。其四、融資大多為散戶持有居多，除了受從眾行為影響，經實證也顯示經理人持股比率和獨立董監事與融資水位的變化呈正向關係。其五、董事會質押為董監事將股票作為抵押借款之程度，當其質押比率過高時，並非被視為正面的訊息，是以散戶對高董監事質押比率的個股也比較不青睞。 This study investigates whether shareholding change of institutions, domestic institutions and dealer as well as the change of margin level and short selling level would be affected by the variables in term of board structure and financial statements. By employing the data from 2010-2014 for the firm listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange, this study have the following important findings as shown below. First, forging institutions might not prefer holding the shares of the firms with high debt ratio and large board size deemed as the firm with corporate governance issue. Second, the firms with higher director holding ratio would be regarded as the firms with better corporate governance, which might be the essential concern for increasing shareholding holding for domestic institutions. Thirds, the trading behaviors of the deader are inclined to short-term trading. As a result, the fundamental issues in term of financial statements and corporate governance might not be the main issue for enhancing shareholding. Four, most of margin trading is operated by individual investors, and the results reveal that margin trading is higher for firms with either higher manager holding ratio or recruiting independent directors. Fifth, the firms with higher director pledge ratio might be regarded as positive signals, and the result show that the individual investors might not prefer the firms with higher director pledge ratio.