巴塞爾協議Ⅲ在2010年彌補資本管制和流動性風險。權益報酬評價之交換選擇權理論適用於受監管銀行之或有請求權，本篇論文探討在資本管制下的銀行績效（違約風險）以及技術選擇（人力資源投資相對於資訊科技投資）如何影響零售銀行的報酬。本篇論文試圖證明增加人力資源（保守型技術）相對於資訊科技（先進型技術）的投資，可以減少銀行的權益報酬違約風險。以及在資本管制下，增加保守型技術相對於先進行技術會擴大銀行違約風險的程度。本論文最後得到的結論是在資本管制下，於零售金融服務中投入資訊科技有助於銀行的獲利能力。 Basel Ⅲ in 2010 remedied the regulatory capital and liquidity failures. The swaption theory of corporate security valuation is applied to the contingent claims of a regulated bank. This thesis examines how capital regulation affects a bank’s performance (default risk) and how this effect varies across technology choices (human resource investment relative to information technology investment) that occurred in the return to retail banking. We have two main results. First, a backward technology, an increase in the human resource investment relative to the information technology investment, decreases the default risk in the bank’s equity returns. Second, the positive effect of capital regulation on the bank default risk is less significant when the bank chooses a backward technology than an advanced technology. Technology and regulation as such adversely affect the bank survival probability of the return to retail banking.
