董監事及重要職員責任保險不僅可以保障公司的董監事及高階經理人等重要職員，更能保護公司的投資人與小股東。但是過去文獻指出公司投保董監事及重要職員責任保險容易導致專業經理人有事後的道德風險，進而提高公司的舉債資金成本。本研究旨在探討董監事及重要職員責任保險對公司舉債資金成本的影響，研究資料取自 2008 年至 2014 年在臺灣證券交易所股份有限公司與財團法人中華民國櫃檯買賣中心掛牌交易的上市、上櫃公司。實證結果顯示，相對於沒有投保董監事及重要職員責任保險的公司，有投保董監事及重要職員責任保險的公司會有較高的舉債資金成本，且董監事及重要職員責任保險保障愈高，公司的舉債資金成本也會愈大。其次，相較於資訊不對稱程度較大的公司，資訊不對稱程度比較小的公司投保董監事及重要職員責任保險與否，或者保險保障的大小，均不會影響公司的舉債資金成本；相反的，相較於資訊不對稱程度比較小的公司，資訊不對稱程度比較大的公司，投保董監事及重要職員責任保險，且董監事及重要職員責任保險保障愈高，則公司的舉債資金成本愈高。最後，有投保董監事及重要職員責任保險的公司其向本土產險公司投保者相較於與外商產險公司投保者，其與公司的舉債成本之間皆呈現顯著的負向關係。 Directors’ and Officers’ liabilities insurance has received a lot of attention from practice and academics. D&O insurance not only can protect directors’ and officers’ interest but also outside shareholders. However, previous literature pointed that D&O insurance might lead to the opportunistic behavior for managers such that managers happen to moral hazard, resulting in a higher cost of debt. This study is aimed to examine the relation between D&O insurance and cost of debt. Using companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei Exchange from 2008 to 2014, we find that firms with D&O insurance have higher loan spreads than those with no D&O insurance. Moreover, for firms with D&O insurance, the higher the converges, the higher the cost of debt is. Furthermore, we find that for firms with higher information asymmetry, having D&O insurance tends to enlarge. However, for company with lower information asymmetry, D&O insurance is not associated with cost of debt. Finally, we find that D&O insurance is negative relationship with cost of debt regardless the insurance policy provided by domestic or foreign insurance companies.
