This study explores the influence of product market competition on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The research sample comprises firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and Taipei Exchange from 2003 to 2014. The results indicate that the managers of firms with low product market power or facing strong market competition could be induced to employ earnings management through accounting discretion and real operational activities. The influence of product market power on earnings management is more significant than that of market competition. The regression results for subsamples classified by product market power and industry competition indicate that, in the subsamples where product market power is weak or industry competition is fierce, the effect of corporate governance on earnings management could easily fail, and even exacerbate managerial earnings manipulation. In other words, the pressure from market competition could reduce the effect of corporate governance and even induce managers to employ earnings management. The difference between corporate governance and earnings management is even more pronounced when product market power and industry competition are considered simultaneously in the subsample grouping.
