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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/110408

    Title: 股權獲利誘因與公司經營績效關係之研究
    Other Titles: The affection of profit incentive on the relationship between ownership and corporate performance
    Authors: 錢思敏
    Keywords: 股權結構;公司治理;股權獲利誘因;董事持股;經理人持股;經營績效;資通訊產業;Profit incentive;Ownership structure;Corporate governance;Directorial ownership;Managerial ownership;Corporate performance;ICT Industry
    Date: 2011-07-21
    Issue Date: 2017-06-17 02:10:30 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 股權獲利誘因是本研究提出用來解釋公司董事與經理人之股權結構與公司經營績效關係的重要變數。經由文獻回顧,本研究提出對董事與經理人持股具有影響性的股權獲利誘因來源。由於ICT與非ICT公司之中對董事與經理人持股具有影響之股權獲利誘因有所不同,因此,本研究除了就全體樣本資料進行分析之外,另外也分別就ICT公司與非ICT公司內,區分董事與經理人之不同角色與公司經營績效關係,且在考量股權結構的內生性後,建立董事持股與經理人持股與公司經營績效的聯立模型。本研究以1994年至2004年上市製造業公司為研究對象,實證結果顯示,在非ICT公司,利用股票發放制度之設計或是以其他方式增加董事與經理人持股,將有助增加經營績效,符合利益收斂假說。另外,股權獲利誘因之股票分紅獎勵制度能夠提供ICT公司經理人額外獲利,因為經理人會在公司經營績效好時售出股票。然而,經由比較利益法則下,可能會因為特權消費的效果大於提供固定薪水或股票而來的獲利報酬,可能會有利益掠奪假說的行為發生。

    Profit Incentive is the variable and this study provided to explain the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. According the literature review, our study concludes the most influential sources of profit incentive. Because of the different sources of profit incentive for directors and managers between ICT and non-ICT firms, we analyzed all samples, ICT firms and non-ICT firms. Taking endogeneity endogenous of ownership structure into consideration, we set up simultaneous models for ownership structure and corporate performance. The samples in the study were on the basis of listed manufacturing firms including 199 ICT firms and 280 non-ICT firms from 1994 to 2004. The empirical implications of this study showed that in non-ICT firms, by applying stock allotment or other ways to increase directorial and managerial ownership would improve corporate performance, the results were consistent with the convergence-of-interest hypothesis. On the other hand, profit incentive of stock bonus for managers in ICT firms would offer extra profit because managers would sell out some stocks when corporate performance is superior. However, based on comparative advantage rule, managers might take entrenchment actions after comparing the profit between to misusage of authority and reward of their salary or stocks.
    Appears in Collections:[企業管理學系暨研究所] 專書

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