淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/110155
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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/110155


    Title: CEO Turnover and Reinsurance Demand in the U.S. Property Casualty Insurance Industry
    Authors: Chia-Ling Ho
    Keywords: reinsurance demand;CEO turnover;non-routine CEO turnover;forced CEO turnover;SOX Act
    Date: 2017-05
    Issue Date: 2017-03-30 02:10:19 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: National Taiwan University * College of Management,Guoli Taiwan Daxue Guanli Xueyuan
    Abstract: This paper examines the impact of CEO turnover on reinsurance demand in the U.S. property casualty insurance industry. Our evidence shows that insurers with CEO turnover are more likely to increase reinsurance demand after CEO turnover. More detailed analyses indicates that insurers with non-routine (forced) CEO turnover are more likely to increase reinsurance than insurers without CEO turnover, but insurers with routine (voluntary) CEO turnover are not likely to change reinsurance policies after CEO turnover. One possible explanation for these results is that an insurer with a new CEO resulting from non-routine (forced) CEO turnover is more likely to increase demand for reinsurance to stabilize earnings and reduce risk to protect the job security of the new CEO. The evidence shows that the interaction effect between mutual form and CEO turnover is negatively related to reinsurance demand after CEO turnover. Finally, our results also show that insurers with CEO turnover are not related to reinsurance demand after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. The overall results of this study indicate that CEO turnovers have a significant impact on the demand for reinsurance.
    Relation: NTU Management Review 27(2S), p.245-288
    DOI: 10.6226/NTUMR.2017.DEC.RM104-009
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Insurance Insurance] Journal Article

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