This paper examines the impact of CEO turnover on reinsurance demand in the U.S. property casualty insurance industry. Our evidence shows that insurers with CEO turnover are more likely to increase reinsurance demand after CEO turnover. More detailed analyses indicates that insurers with non-routine (forced) CEO turnover are more likely to increase reinsurance than insurers without CEO turnover, but insurers with routine (voluntary) CEO turnover are not likely to change reinsurance policies after CEO turnover. One possible explanation for these results is that an insurer with a new CEO resulting from non-routine (forced) CEO turnover is more likely to increase demand for reinsurance to stabilize earnings and reduce risk to protect the job security of the new CEO. The evidence shows that the interaction effect between mutual form and CEO turnover is negatively related to reinsurance demand after CEO turnover. Finally, our results also show that insurers with CEO turnover are not related to reinsurance demand after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. The overall results of this study indicate that CEO turnovers have a significant impact on the demand for reinsurance.