Politically connected lending, government capital injection, and bank performance

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 國際企業學系暨研究所 > 期刊論文 > Item 987654321/110034

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题名:	Politically connected lending, government capital injection, and bank performance
作者:	Jou, Rosemary;Chen, Shi;Tsai, Jeng-Yan
关键词:	Government capital injection;Ownership structure;Political connection;Barrier option
日期:	2017-01
上传时间:	2017-03-21 02:10:38 (UTC+8)
出版者:	Elsevier BV
摘要:	This paper takes a contingent claim approach to evaluate the equity and risk of a bank. The paper investigates how government capital injection affects the bank's lending and equity risk, and how these effects vary across remaining privately owned and becoming government-owned. In particular, we argue that the strength of government ownership is useful in disciplining management of preferential access to debt financing for politically connected borrowing firms. It is shown that government capital injection leads to superior performance and greater safety for the bank remaining privately owned. The advantage of large capital is likely to be more pronounced to equity return, but less to safety for the government-owned bank. Moreover, political connection reinforces the increased return performance and safety. Government capital injection as such makes the bank less prone to risk-taking, thereby affecting the stability of the banking system.
關聯:	International Review of Economics and Finance 47, p.220-232
DOI:	10.1016/j.iref.2016.10.011
显示于类别:	[國際企業學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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