本研究主要探討薪酬委員會的監督品質對於高階經理人的現金紅利薪酬與企
業績效之影響。研究對象為我國上市及上櫃公司，樣本期間主要為 2011 年與 2012
年，本研究以五項品質特性衡量薪酬委員會的監督品質（薪酬委員會委員之董事年
資、規模、每年開會次數、委員出席率與獨立董事比例），採用兩階段估計方法
（two-stage method）探討薪酬委員會的品質對於高階經理人現金紅利薪酬與企業績
效關聯性之影響。研究結果指出當薪酬委員會品質提高時，在薪酬合約制定可降低
現金紅利薪酬的權重達到相同的企業績效。本研究之結果除可彌補相關文獻之不足
外，亦可作為企業未來在調整薪酬委員會的功能及制定高階經理人薪酬時之參考。
The objective of this study is to discuss the substitution effect of managers’
cash bonuses and the quality of compensation committee on firm performance. In this
study we used public listed companies in Taiwan as our study sample and our sample
period is from Jan. 2011 to Dec. 2012. Cash bonus were used as a proxy for managers’
incentive compensation, and five quality characteristics (directors’ seniority, size of
compensation committee, frequency of meetings, members attendance rate and proportion
of independent directors) were used to measure the quality of compensation committee.
We used two-stage least squared regression to examine the effect of the quality of
compensation committee on the association between managers’ cash bonuses and firm
performance. Our results found that there is a substitution relationship exists between
managers’ cash bonuses and the quality of the compensation committee. This provides
evidence for the supposition that companies with a high quality compensation committee
could reduce cash bonuses and still achieve the same business performance.
Relation:
Journal of Contemporary Accounting=當代會計期刊 17(1), pp.63-89
