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    題名: 高階主管薪酬結構、支配能力與研究發展支出
    CEO Compensation Structure, Dominance and R&D Expenditures
    作者: 許永聲;詹玉嫻;黃婉婷
    關鍵詞: 薪酬結構;支配能力;裁減研發支出;compensation structure;CEO dominance;R&D expenditure reduction
    日期: 2016-05
    上傳時間: 2017-01-12 14:36:00 (UTC+8)
    出版者: 淡江大學出版中心
    摘要: 本文從薪酬誘因與董事會監督機制兩個公司治理構面,探討高階主管薪酬結
    構與支配能力,對企業裁減研發支出之短視行為的影響。實證結果發現,在自利的
    動機下,高階主管會利用裁減研發支出方式,提高當期盈餘以增加其薪酬。而提高
    高階主管股票基礎薪酬比率,會降低裁減研發支出的可能性,且在股票基礎導向的
    薪酬結構下,透過股票基礎薪酬比率降低企業裁減研發支出的可能性,會高於現金
    基礎導向的薪酬結構。此外高階主管具支配能力,所受監督的程度較低,出現裁減
    研發支出的可能性較高,但是提高股票基礎薪酬比率,所降低裁減研發支出可能性
    的效果,反而會較大。
    From two aspects of corporate governance: namely compensation incentive
    and board monitoring mechanism, this paper aims to explore the impact of CEO
    compensation structure and dominance on R&D expenditure reduction. Empirical results
    indicate that myopic CEOs with their self-interest incentive tend to curtail R&D
    expenditure so as to increase the current earnings and their compensation. If their
    share-based compensation ratio increased, CEOs will be less likely to curtail R&D
    expenditures, this likelihood being higher than in cash-based compensation structure. In
    addition, the dominance power granted by CEOs with means they receive less
    monitoring, hence the higher likelihood of curtaining R&D expenditure, this likelihood
    becoming more prominent when the share-based compensation ratio is increased.
    關聯: Journal of Contemporary Accounting=當代會計期刊 17(1), pp.35-62
    顯示於類別:[當代會計期刊] 第17卷第1期

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