淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/108981
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 62822/95882 (66%)
Visitors : 4017872      Online Users : 747
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
    •  Adv. Search
    Home ‧ Login ‧ Upload ‧ Help ‧ About ‧ Administer Goto mobile version


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/108981


    Title: Political connections, managerial incentives and auditor choice: evidence from China
    Authors: Chia-Ling Cheng;Chih-Shun Hsu;Fan-Hua Kung
    Keywords: State ownership;Managerial incentives;Political connections;Auditor choice
    Date: 2015-10
    Issue Date: 2016-12-21 02:10:19 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
    Abstract: Purpose
    – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the political connections of firms, managerial incentives and auditor choice. Data from China were used to determine whether managers in firms with political connections are more likely to hire auditors of low quality to help them cover up earnings management and opportunistic behavior.

    Design/methodology/approach
    – Cross-sectional analysis was conducted using data covering the period from 2003 to 2009 and the Top 10 auditors were used as a proxy to represent the demand for high-quality auditors. Three proxies were used to measure the political connectedness: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), politically connected CEOs and state ownership.

    Findings
    – This paper provides empirical evidence that firms with political connections do not demand stringency in the monitoring and information roles of auditing. Moreover, politically connected firms with high managerial incentives are likely to choose non-Top 10 auditors.

    Originality/value
    – This paper provides a unique focus on the role of managerial incentives in the appointment of auditors. This paper tests the managerial opportunism hypothesis in another context and results of this paper help to elucidate the effects of managerial incentives on the demand of audit quality.
    Relation: Pacific Accounting Review 27(4), p.441-465
    DOI: 10.1108/PAR-10-2013-0096
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Accounting] Journal Article

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    index.html0KbHTML167View/Open
    Political connections, managerial incentives and auditor choice_ evidence from China.pdf13315KbAdobe PDF2View/Open

    All items in 機構典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - Feedback