淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/108164
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 64191/96979 (66%)
造访人次 : 8093426      在线人数 : 12011
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧：
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号"，以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻，建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段，可获得较完整数据
    •  进阶搜寻


    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/108164


    题名: Over-investment, the marginal value of cash holdings and corporate governance
    作者: Huang, Chih Jen;Liao, Tsai-Ling;Chang, Yu-Shan
    关键词: Corporate governance;Cash holdings;Agency costs;Over-investment
    日期: 2015-04-01
    上传时间: 2016-11-02 02:10:48 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Studies in Economic Analysis
    摘要: Purpose
    – The purpose of this paper is to examine how investors’ valuation of cash holdings is related to firm-level investment.

    Design/methodology/approach
    – As prior studies note that holding excess cash serve as a driver to would be over-investing, and that over-investment imposes substantial agency costs on shareholders, the authors focus on the value implications of holding cash in the presence of over-investment from the perspective of shareholders.

    Findings
    – By examining the publicly traded companies on Taiwan stock market, the authors uncover that cash is valued less in firms with over-investment than in those with under-investment and the magnitude of over-investment is negatively related to the marginal value of cash holdings (MVCH). It reveals that investment activities impact the value that shareholders place on cash holdings. Moreover, further tests indicate that higher block holdings and the presence of independent directors on boards can effectively mitigate the negative impact of over-investment on the MVCH.

    Practical implications
    – This paper enhances the understanding of the valuation implications of cash reserves held by firms with over-investment and the effectiveness of governance structures in containing the detrimental effect of investment-related agency costs on the value of holding cash.

    Originality/value
    – This paper provides pioneering evidence that outside investors discount cash assets in over-investing firms to reflect their expectations that they will not receive the full benefit of these assets; and this paper extends the literature on corporate governance by assessing the role of governance mechanisms in reversing the negative relation between over-investment and the MVCH.
    關聯: Studies in Economics and Finance 32(2), pp.204-221
    DOI: 10.1108/SEF-07-2013-0101
    显示于类别:[會計學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 大小格式浏览次数
    index.html0KbHTML160检视/开启

    在機構典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.

    TAIR相关文章

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - 回馈