This dissertation studies Taiwan's security sector refonn, one that intends to nationalize
the anned forces and intelligence services by removing partisan political control and
placing the security sector under state civilian governance. This dissertation asks why
civil-military relations in Taiwan remain stable dunng this refonn process in the face of
three major challenges: external threat posed by China, domestic democratization process,
and organizational legacy of party-military traditions. This study posits that all three
conditions facilitate military subordination to civilian control, but at the same time each
presents certain challenges for the shaping of an apolitical security sector. Interviews with
military and intelligence officers and analyses of personal memoirs of relevant
government officials fmd that party-army traditions have facilitated the military
subordination willIe undermining the endeavors to depoliticize the military. ]n contrast to
conventional wisdoms, the threat environment is the least powerful factor in the
explanation of stabilized civil-military relations in Taiwan. On the other hand, democratic
transition and consolidation have best contributed to the institutionalization of civilian
control and the cultivation of an apolitical ethos. Finally, this study also finds that
interactive effects of the three conditions are at work in stabilizing civil-military relations
when the security sector faces difficult decisions. Most indicative is the securitization
efforts that excessively heighten the threat perceptions under Taiwan's highly divided
society. While civilian politicians may exaggerate the threat Taiwan faces to serve their
re-election interest, security sector actors follow the civilians' political moves to satisfy their corporate interests. At the same time, security sector actors claim that they have Dot
fallen back to a politicized military since they simply follow and support the civilian
leaders' decisions.