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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/107103

    Title: Technology Licensing with Asymmetric Absorptive Capacity
    Authors: Chih-Wei Chang;Yan-Shu Lin;Ming-Fang Tsai
    Keywords: Fixed fee;royalty;asymmetric absorptive capacity;welfare-reducing licensing
    Date: 2016-06-08
    Issue Date: 2016-08-15
    Publisher: Routledge
    Abstract: This paper establishes a duopoly model to investigate the impacts of asymmetric absorptive capacity and asymmetric production cost on international technology licensing by an outside patent-holder. We find that, irrespective of fixed fee and royalty licensing, the patent-holder may adopt exclusively licensing if the difference in the absorptive capacity of two firms is large enough; otherwise, it will license to both firms. Surprisingly, such international licensing may be welfare-reducing if the difference in absorptive capacities between two licensees is large enough.
    Relation: Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 23(3), pp.278-290
    DOI: 10.1080/16081625.2016.1188452
    Appears in Collections:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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