English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文筆數/總筆數 : 52374/87459 (60%)
造訪人次 : 9155232      線上人數 : 282
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
搜尋範圍 查詢小技巧:
  • 您可在西文檢索詞彙前後加上"雙引號",以獲取較精準的檢索結果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜尋,建議至進階搜尋限定作者欄位,可獲得較完整資料
  • 進階搜尋
    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/106045

    題名: Political Connections, Managerial Incentives and Auditor Choice: Evidence from China
    作者: Cheng, Chia-Ling;Hsu, Chih-Shun;Kung, Fan-Hua
    關鍵詞: State ownership;Managerial incentives;Political connections;Auditor choice
    日期: 2015-11-11
    上傳時間: 2016-04-22 13:16:39 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
    摘要: Purpose
    – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the political connections of firms, managerial incentives and auditor choice. Data from China were used to determine whether managers in firms with political connections are more likely to hire auditors of low quality to help them cover up earnings management and opportunistic behavior.

    – Cross-sectional analysis was conducted using data covering the period from 2003 to 2009 and the Top 10 auditors were used as a proxy to represent the demand for high-quality auditors. Three proxies were used to measure the political connectedness: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), politically connected CEOs and state ownership.

    – This paper provides empirical evidence that firms with political connections do not demand stringency in the monitoring and information roles of auditing. Moreover, politically connected firms with high managerial incentives are likely to choose non-Top 10 auditors.

    – This paper provides a unique focus on the role of managerial incentives in the appointment of auditors. This paper tests the managerial opportunism hypothesis in another context and results of this paper help to elucidate the effects of managerial incentives on the demand of audit quality.
    關聯: Pacific Accounting Review 27(4), pp.441-465
    DOI: 10.1108/PAR-10-2013-0096
    顯示於類別:[會計學系暨研究所] 期刊論文


    檔案 描述 大小格式瀏覽次數



    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - 回饋