Does Monitoring by the Media Improve the Performance of Government Banks?

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 財務金融學系暨研究所 > 期刊論文 > Item 987654321/105912

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题名:	Does Monitoring by the Media Improve the Performance of Government Banks?
作者:	Ho, Po-Hsin;Chen, Hung-Kun;Chi, Che-Wei;Lin, Chih-Yung Lin
关键词:	Government banks;Media monitoring;Operation performance;Lending corruption
日期:	2016-02-02
上传时间:	2016-04-22 13:10:46 (UTC+8)
出版者:	1572-3089
摘要:	By examining cross-country data for the period from 2000 to 2010, this study investigates whether monitoring by the media affects the performance of government-owned banks (GOBs). The results indicate that GOBs under strong monitoring do not underperform privately owned banks (POBs), whereas those under weak monitoring do underperform POBs. Further, we find that the strength of the media’s monitoring has an important effect on corruption behavior and banks’ performance. This result provides an important policy implication that the government should minimize its ownership, and therefore its influence, in the media sector if it intends to improve the performance of its GOBs.
關聯:	Journal of Financial Stability 22, pp.76–87
DOI:	10.1016/j.jfs.2015.12.006
显示于类别:	[財務金融學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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