本研究旨在探討美國產險公司董事會與高階經理人是否合謀操縱賠款準備金。由於董事薪酬與高階經理人薪酬可能存在內生性，本研究同時採用兩階段最小平方法(two-stage least square method, 2SLS)與固定效果模型(fixed-effect model)估計迴歸模型。本研究亦檢視董事與高階經理人誘因薪酬的關係，並探討董事與高階經理人在誘因薪酬下，是否也有合謀操縱賠款準備金之情形。實證結果顯示，董事與高階經理人間的薪酬呈現顯著的正相關；高階經理人薪酬與準備金誤差值亦呈現顯著的正相關。本研究推測，當高階經理人薪酬較低，或者未達激勵薪酬計畫的上限時，會設法提升公司的淨收益，此時高階經理人會低估準備金，以期獲取較高薪酬。此外，本研究發現，受超額董事薪酬影響的高階經理人薪酬與準備金誤差呈現更為顯著的正向關係，此結果再次驗證董事與高階經理人很可能為了薪酬的極大化，而合謀操縱準備金。然而，高階經理人誘因薪酬與準備金誤差則呈現不顯著的正向關係，故誘因薪酬可能減少高階經理人與董事合謀操縱準備金之動機。因此，本研究對於董事會與高階經理人薪酬之相關研究，提出了新的證據。 This thesis aims to investigate whether board members and CEO collude to manipulate loss reserve in U.S. property-casualty insurance industry. Because there may exist an endogeneity problem between CEO compensation and board compensation, this thesis uses both two-stage least square method (2SLS) and fixed-effect model to test regression models.The empirical results show that excess director compensation has a positive relationship with CEO compensation, and CEO compensation also has a significant and positive correlation with reserve error. We speculate that CEOs who receive lower compensation or bonuses that do not reach the cap tend to underestimate current-year loss reserve in order to obtain higher compensation. This thesis also finds that CEO compensation due to director excess compensation has a more significantly positive effect on reserve error than CEO compensation does. This result has proven that directors and CEO are likely to conspire to manipulate loss reserve in order to maximize their compensation. CEO’s incentive compensation is also positively correlated with reserve error but not significant in our result, because incentive compensation may decrease collusion. Therefore, we propose a new evidence for the literature on board and CEO compensation.