| 摘要: | 當日本政府在2012年4月17日拋出可能對釣魚台進行「國有化」，還多次表示「國有化」後將在島上「派駐公務員」和「建立設施」，以體現對釣魚台的「有效管理」。面對此一情勢發展，中共認定日本政府決心推翻1972年雙方所達成的「擱置爭議」共識，若中共繼續姑息，日本將會得寸進尺，遂決定對日本發動「強制外交」。由於日本和美國具有同盟關係，使中共「強制外交」的對象不僅只有日本，而是美國和日本的聯盟。
為了遂行「強制外交」，中共採取了包括海上執法武力維權執法和解放軍軍力展示等手段的武力威脅，搭配若干非武力措施，向日本和美國施壓，結合外交談判來追求下列四項目標：一、要求日本改變政策，停止在釣魚台派駐人員；二、要求日本承認釣魚台主權存在爭議；三、要求日本默認釣魚台周邊海域共管；四、要求美國約束日本並勸說日本妥協。
其中，中共海上執法武力在爭議海域的「常態性巡邏」、甚至進入釣魚台「領海」巡航等措施，有效挑戰了日本對釣魚台的控制，創造了對中共有利的「新既成事實」。解放軍也規劃執行經過設計的軍力展示，以顯示中共的決心，並對日本和美國施加長期且逐漸升高的壓力，以支援外交談判。而透過「強制外交」，中共的第一個目標完全達成、第三個和第四個目標則是「大部分達成」。第二個目標在經過近二年的談判後，最後以日本所提的「爭議各表」模式收場，因此可說是「部分達成」。整體而言，中共在此次爭議中，透過「強制外交」獲得直接的收益。
透過對中共在此次爭議中實施「強制外交」的研究，不僅增加了對中共運用「強制外交」的理解，有助於研判中共日後遂行「強制外交」的動向。更因為中共在此次爭議中的「強制外交」，在形態上是「以寡擊眾」和「以弱凌強」，與絕大多數的案例形態明顯不同；因此，對中共在本次爭議中所實施「強制外交」的探討，也充實了「強制外交」的理論。
At the time when the Japanese government releases the possible “Nationalization of the Diaoyutai Islands” on 17 April, 2012, and expresses to “dispatch civil servants “on the Islands in order to realize the “de facto management”, to cope with this situation, the PRC government assumes that the Japanese government decides to break the bilateral consensus of “setting aside the disputes”, and is determined to enforce the “coercive diplomacy” on Japan. Owing to the US-Japan alliance, the opponents of the PRC’s “coercive diplomacy” not only includes Japan, but also the alliance itself.
In order to put the “coercive diplomacy” into practice, the PRC government takes both the maritime law enforcement as well as the exercise of PLA military power, and combines the above mentioned measures with the non-military ones in giving pressure on Japan and the US, for achieving the below four objectives via diplomatic negotiations:
1. the request of non-dispatch of civil servants on Islands;
2. the request of Japan in admitting the fact that the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands is in disputes;
3. the request of Japan in acknowledging tacitly the co-management of the seas peripheral to the Diaoyutai Islands;
4. the request of the US in persuasion of compromises from Japan.
Amongst all, the PRC’s “normalization of patrols” in the peripheral maritime areas of the Diaoyutai Islands and even the patrols into the “territorial waters” of the Diaoyutai Islands, effectively challenge the Japan’s control over the Islands and creates the “new de facto” control favorable to the PRC. The PLA also exercises the carefully-designed military demonstration to show the PRC’s determination. In the meantime, the PRC has been keeping up the long-term and increasingly-escalated pressure on Japan and the US to support its diplomatic negotiations in parallel. The whole dispute has come to an end in November 2014 and the PRC successfully gained the direct fruitful results from the “coercive diplomacy”.
Through the research on the PRC’s exercise of the “coercive diplomacy” in this case, it not only increases the understanding of the PRC’s “coercive diplomacy ”, but also it helps to study and judge the trends of its “coercive diplomacy” in the future. In a nutshell, the patterns of the PRC’s “coercive diplomacy” in this case is “to prevail against such overwhelming odds” and “to use one’s weak strength to win over the strong”, obviously different than other cases; hence, it also assists to broaden the theory of the “coercive diplomacy”. |
