淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/104814
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    Title: The possibility of redemption : the posthuman existential predicament in Kazuo Ishiguro's Never Let Me Go
    Other Titles: 論救贖的可能 : 《別讓我走》後人類語境中的存在困境與追尋
    Authors: 蕭安哲;Hsiao, An-Che
    Contributors: 淡江大學英文學系碩士班
    黃涵榆;Huang, Han-Yu
    Keywords: 存在主義;人為性;被拋性;免疫化;身體;自由選擇;existentialism;facticity;Thrownness;immunization;body;free choice
    Date: 2015
    Issue Date: 2016-01-22 14:39:11 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本論文旨在探討石黑一雄《別讓我走》中主角們所面臨存在的困境,以及在看似悲慘的命運下是否存在救贖的可能性。本篇論文共有三個章節,第一章試圖以沙特及海德格的論點討論複製人的孤獨與生命的毫無意義。此外,本章亦利用沙特對於他人的存在的理論,進一步討論複製人之間溝通的不可能性。
    第二章則以複製人的死亡與身體作為主軸,著眼於沙特對於死亡的討論,進一步闡述並證明死亡並無法給人下定義,唯一能證明自己存在的是自身的行為。因此,人類與複製人之間並不會因為死亡的存在而有差別。本章內文同時引用艾斯波西托的觀點去探究複製人存在的困境,根據他所提出的共群及免疫化的理論,理解到複製人正是運用自己的身體作為禮物與人類交換生活空間。
    本論文最後試圖透過福山的觀點解釋人類與複製人的生存困境,福山認為現代生物科技構成最大的威脅在於它可能會改變人性。另外,本文以存在主義的角度探討複製人生存的可能性,透過對死亡的焦慮產生的本真性,生命的有限性反而會使生命產生意義。此外,根據沙特的自由選擇理論,對複製人而言透過自由選擇將人為性轉變為自身的處境,這個自由選擇的過程亦是一種獲得救贖的方式。
    This thesis mainly discusses the protagonists’ depressing fate in Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go. The main focuses of this thesis are to probe into the protagonists’ existential predicament and the possibility of redemption. Chapter one draws the ideas from Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger to explore the human clones’ solitude and futility; Furthermore, I borrow the Sartre’s argument about the existence of Others to examine the impossibility of communication between human clones.
    In chapter two, the main concerns are human clones’ death and bodies. I explore the topic of death by citing Sartre’s viewpoints. I consider that death cannot define who human clones are, only the subjectivity can define the meaning of life by his/her actions. In that case, we could say that there is no difference between human beings and human clones. Then I shift my viewpoint from existentialism to biopolitics, I manage to cite Roberto Esposito to elaborate human clones’ predicament. According to his concepts about community and immunity, I conclude that human clones don’t own their bodies, because they have to use their bodies as gifts for the community, the human world.
    In the final chapter, I manage to expound the predicament of humans and clones from Francis Fukuyama’s viewpoints. He believes that the most significant threat posed by contemporary biotechnology is the possibility that it will alter human nature. In terms of existentialism, finitude can make life meaningful. I believe that, for human clones, we could see authenticity is the possibility of redemption. The consciousness towards death makes them authentic and unique. In addition, I think that once clones decide to take actions, the situation, or the facticity, will become different. In conclusion, I think that there is redemption for human clones.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of English] Thesis

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