|摘要: ||美國國務院前副首席助理國務卿凱德磊於2002年至2004年期間內，多次會晤我國駐美人員程念慈，2004年9月4日於波多馬克河旁登陸餐廳被FBI查獲後，「凱德磊案」於美國國內爆發。事後2005年起，我國國安局透過媒體之報導，得知此事恐影響臺美關係，配合美方調查。此案之動盪不安其原因有三：（一）凱德磊為美國資深高層外交官員；（二）案發當時正值臺美係互信跌入谷底；(三) 兩岸問題則因一邊一國、飛彈公投、陸策公投、廢統與入聯公投而緊繃。因此，本論文的目的是從陳水扁總統與政府角度看凱德磊案，觀察凱德磊對程念慈提供的情報是否對他有所助益。|
本論文運用艾里遜與謝利高於1999年所合著之三個外交決策模式──理性行為模式（Rational Actor Model）、組織行為模式（Organizational Behavior Model）以及政府政治模式（Governmental Politics Model）來做為主要理論之基礎，以及官方文件資料其中以法院備忘錄（United States of America V. Donald Willis Keyser, Defendant- Memorandum in Support of Motion to Find Defendant in Material Breach of Plea Agreement and to Release the Government from Its Plea Obligations）為依據，來解讀凱德磊案對我國外交決策之影響與衝擊。
Donald W. Keyser, a former US principal deputy assistant secretary of state and Isabelle Cheng, a female junior officer of Taiwan''s NSB had met a couple of times and exchanged intelligence materials between 2002 and 2004. They were caught at Indigo Landing Restaurant near Potomac River in Washington by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on September 4, 2004. Later on, “the Keyser Case” broke out in the United States. Since 2005, the National Security Bureau (NSB) realized that it could potentially affect Taiwan-US relations if it was reported in the media. As a result, they cooperated with the United States in the process of investigation. This case was turbulent for three reasons. First, Keyser was a senior diplomat of the United States. Second, the mutual trust between Taiwan and the United States significantly declined. Third, the cross-Strait relations were in decline as a result of a series controversies such as “One Country on Either Side,” “Missile Procurement Referendum voting,” “Mainland Policy Referendum Voting,” “Abolishment of National Unification Guideline and National Unification Council,” and “UN bid Referendum voting.” Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to explore whether the information and intelligence Keyser offered Cheng was valuable to then President Chen.
In the book entitled Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis written by Allison T. Graham and Philip D. Zelikow in 1999, the three models for foreign policy decision-making, namely, Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and Governmental Politics Model (GPM) were the fundamental theoretic models in use.
One thing which must be clarified here is that the case study in this thesis is totally different from most case studies in the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship. Indeed, most case studies are analyzed from the perspectives of the U.S. government. Nonetheless, the three models are applied in this thesis to analyze “the Keyser Case” from the perspectives of Taiwan’s former president Chen Shui-bian and his government.
Therefore, this thesis presents three hypotheses to see whether “the Keyser Case” can be successfully verified.
H1：The more a policy option with minimal cost and maximal utility is, the more likely it would be adopted as a policy.
H2：The more capable a governmental organization is, the more like it would be adopted as a policy.
H3：The more access a participant owns to the president, the more likely his policy recommendations would be adopted as a policy.
First, from the perspective of Chen Shui-bain, his“One Country on Either Side,” “Missile Procurement Referendum voting,” “Mainland Policy Referendum Voting,” “Abolishment of National Unification Guideline and National Unification Council,” and “UN bid Referendum voting” challenged not only Mainland China but also the United States. Beijing and Washington’s dissatisfaction with him compelled him to find a U.S. governmental official to analyze and interpret the information and intelligence for him. Cheng “happened” to meet Keyser in 2002 with the latter becoming Chen’s primary source of information and intelligence on U.S.-China relations and cross-Strait relations. Therefore, from Chen’s perspective, H1 (The more a policy option with minimal cost and maximal utility is, the more likely it would be adopted as a policy) is by and largely verified successfully.
Second, from the perspective of the Chen administration, Department of State (DOS) is the most capable governmental institution in tackling foreign policy among all U.S. governmental organizations. Sometimes, DOS is as important as the national Security Council (NSC). Because Taiwan did not have direct channel with the NSC, the DOS became the primary U.S. governmental organization which could help the Chen administration to obtain information and intelligence on US-China-Taiwan, Taiwan-US, cross-Strait relations as well as mainland China, and other Asian-Pacific nations. Therefore, H2 (The more capable a governmental organization is, the more like it would be adopted as a policy) is largely verified successfully.
Finally, although Keyser worked for U.S. Department of State, his value was even more important than President Chen’s NSC Secretary General and minister of MOFA. Through the reports from Cheng, including Keyser’s interpreted information and intelligence on US Asian policy, US policy toward China, US policy toward Taiwan, and China’s policy toward Taiwan, would more or less help the president to prepare in advance, accommodate smartly, and avoid unnecessary jeopardy. Therefore, H3 (The more access a participant owns to the president, the more likely his policy recommendations would be adopted as a policy) is by and large verified successfully. .
Therefore, the main theme is that President Chen made good use of Keyser’s analysis and interpreted information and intelligence to more easily make his foreign and mainland China policies, regarded the DOS as the primary source of information and intelligence, viewed Keyser as his personal foreign policy adviser, thereby helping the president to grasp the moment on many issues in advance.