地方政府的公共支出規模，往往與地方政府的預算收入來源、債務餘額、總產出及黨派性政治因素等具有密切關聯性。本文針對臺灣地區20個縣市政府，自2000起至2012年之追蹤資料進行實證分析，檢驗不同的地方財源收入對於公共支出的影響。實證結果發現各地方政府以稅課收入為財源，易導致公共支出的日益擴張，存在「財政幻覺」現象；以中央補助款為財源，亦導致濫支現象，存在捕蠅紙效果；各地方政府也常以公債融通方式籌措資金，惟若不加以節制，將造成以債養債，使財政惡化狀況更為嚴重；另外，也反映出台灣地方政府的公共支出的確伴隨著地方選舉年而擴張，存在政治景氣循環現象。為期地方政府之公共支出決策，更趨合理與建全，本文依據實證結果，研擬未來在公共支出方面之政策建議，包括：地方政府應遵守財政紀律之規範，以防杜財政幻覺效果；地方政府宜提供相關的補助計畫書予中央政府，並由中央持續追蹤補助款之運用，以避免有捕蠅紙效果；中央與地方政府宜制定相關的政策性買票防治方法，以避免存在政策性買票現象。 The amount of public spending of local governments, tend to have a close relationship with the source of budget revenues, debt balance, total output and partisan political factors of local governments. This study focuses on the panel data of 20 local governments in Taiwan, from 2000 to 2012, testing the different revenue sources’ impact of public spending. The empirical results find that taxes as local governments'' revenue resources, it easily leads to the expansion of public spending and exists a "fiscal illusion" phenomenon. Central grants as financial resources, it leads to excessive expenditure and flypaper effect. Local governments often raise funds by bond financing, but if not control well, it will result in debt on debt, and the deterioration of financial situation gets more serious. It also reflects that the increase of Taiwan''s local governments'' spending is indeed followed by the year of local elections, existing a political business cycle phenomenon. To let the local governments’ public expenditure decision-making be more reasonable and sound, this paper based on empirical results and provides some appropriate policy recommendations for future expenditure, including local governments should follow the norm of fiscal discipline to prevent fiscal illusion; local government should provide grants plans to the central government, and the central government should keep track of the use of grants to avoid flypaper effect; the central and local governments should establish laws of bribe prevention to avoid the bribe phenomenon.
