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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/102176

    Title: 影響中國企業盈餘品質的三個因素 : 市場監管、企業社會責任與會計師法律責任
    Other Titles: Earnings quality in China's listed firms : a look at market supervision, corporate social responsibility, and auditor liability
    Authors: 林凱薰;Lin, Kai-Hsun
    Contributors: 淡江大學管理科學學系博士班
    王貞靜;Wang, Chen-Chin;梁德昭;Liang, Te-Chao
    Keywords: 市場監管;企業社會責任;實質活動盈餘管理;法律責任;審計品質;market supervision;corporate social responsibility;real activities earnings management;legal responsibilities;Audit Quality
    Date: 2014
    Issue Date: 2015-05-04 09:49:18 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本論文就市場監管、企業履行社會責任與會計師法律責任等三個角度,探討這些因素對中國上市企業盈餘品質的影響。
    就市場監管而言,本文探討中國上市公司是否會透過實質營業活動來操弄盈餘,以達成中國證監會設定發行新股資格的盈餘門檻。分析結果證實,實質營業活動盈餘管理 (REM) 在中國的確是一個為了達成盈餘管理目標而採取的手段。然而這個現象,會隨著企業所在地市場發展程度的進步而減緩。除此之外,本論文亦發現在2001年證監會43號法令頒行之前,線下項目也同樣是一項盈餘管理的重要工具,然而隨著43號法令的公告,從盈餘管理工具的角度,線下項目的重要性已經被實質交易活動取代。
    This paper explores how market supervision, CSR, and auditor liability affect earnings quality in China’s listed firms. Starting with market supervision, we test whether listed firms in China use real activity earnings management (REM) to manipulate earnings, thus meeting the thresholds for issuing new shares as set by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Our analysis shows that REM in China is a de facto means of reaching earnings management goals, but occurrence thereof is mitigated by the level of market development maturity. In other words, a firm in a mature market is less likely to engage in REM than is a firm in an immature market. In terms of earnings management tools, we also discover that after the CSRC issued Article 43 in 2001, once ubiquitous below-the-line items were largely replaced by real activities.
    To better understand earnings quality, we also study the relationship between non-voluntary CSR and REM, and whether state-owned equity (SOE) structure affects said relationship. Empirical results show that firms in accordance with governmental regulations still score high on CSR, such that manager-level REM is mitigated and a useful mechanism of governance is established. As for SOE structure, it is shown to weaken this relationship. The above conclusions remain consistent when taking the endogeneity of CSR into account.
    Lastly we research how changes in auditor liabilities affect earnings quality. The results show that, following increased legal responsibilities after 2007, both the earnings quality of listed firms and auditor’s audit quality increased. The results of our research provide a good reference for investors, researchers, and stock market authorities responsible for making supervisory policies.
    Appears in Collections:[管理科學學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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